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P R S F A C S 
The South Asian soc i e t i e s are bas ica l ly mul t i -e thnic 
s o c i e t i e s . Therefore» i t is natural tha t an e thnic community 
a s s e r t s i t s s t a tu s as a na t iona l i t y and may c rea te socia l and 
p o l i t i c a l conf l i c t s in the given system. Sr i Lanka is no excep-
t ion to i t . The continued violence/ in which scores of l ives 
are being l o s t every day* is edging convulsion. In t h i s study, 
I have highl ighted the problems of Tamil-speaking community, 
spec ia l ly the Indian migrants, who migrated t o Sr i Lanka during 
l a s t two c e n t u r i e s . They are victims of repress ive pol ic ies of 
successive governments of S r i Lanka. Other Tamil speaking people, 
who migrated t o Sr i Lanka about 2000 years ago, are a lso suffering 
from the discr iminat ion by the majority community, i . e . the 
V I 
Sinhalese . Their v ic t imiza t ion created a l o t of problems. India 
i s not unconcerned with t h e i r problems as they are of Indian 
o r i g i n . The people of India are a lso very synpathet ic and s e n t i -
mental towards them. This p o l i t i c a l and cu l tu ra l ethos of India 
and the Indian people towards the in tens i ty of problems led me 
to work on the problems of these migrants . 
This d i s s e r t a t i o n is a l i b r a ry research based upon h i s -
t o r i c a l a n a l y t i c a l , speculat ive and a p r i o r i approach and formal, 
descriptive-taxonomic and normative-prescript ive method. In 
Chapter I , e f fo r t s have been made t o introduce S r i Lanka in 
h i s t o r i c a l , geographical and demographical r e s p e c t s . Chapters 
I I and I I I deal with the problems, the migrants are facing, as 
such . These are divided in two ca tegor ies , the p o l i t i c a l and 
the e thn ic . The main p o l i t i c a l problem was the question of 
grant of c i t i z ensh ip to Tamils of Indian o r ig in in Sr i Lanka. 
Now t h i s problem has been resolved amicably by the two count r ies . 
But the ethnic problems l inger on. 
Chapters IV and V unfold the a t t i t u d e s adopted by Sr i 
Lanka and India on the problems of the Tamils in S r i Lanka. 
The aggravation of the ethnic conf l i c t and the prospects of 
f inding a p o l i t i c a l so lu t ion receding to the background, the 
r e l a t i o n s between the two countr ies have worsened. I have t r i e d 
v i i 
t o explain and analyse var ious problems and t h e i r solut ions 
ava i lab le in Acts, Pacts , t a l k s and documents of Sr i Lankan 
and Indian governments. The study also r e l i e s upon the sdiolar ly 
researches* papers and cont r ibut ions t o newspapers, >V debt t o 
a l l of them has been acknowledged in the footnotes at the end o£ 
each page. 
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SRI LANKA : AN INTRODUCTION 
The l i n k s between I n d i a and S r i Lanka a re* indeed/ 
un ique . Besides being n e i g h b o u r s , t h e r e i s a d i r e c t l i nkage 
between t h e peop les of S r i Lanka and I n d i a , ©le two dominant 
S r i Lankan communit ies, t he S i n h a l e s e and Tamil •> both owe 
t h e i r o r i g i n t o I n d i a . The S i n h a l e s e came from Eas te rn India 
thousands yea r s ago and t h e Tamils from South Ind ia s i m u l t a -
n e o u s l y . Other group of Tamils from South I n d i a went t o S r i 
Lanka in l 9 t h and f i r s t h a l f of 20th c e n t u r y a s workers in 
co f f ee and t e a p l a n t a t i o n . Former Tamils a r e c a l l e d Sr i 
Lankan Tami l s , o t h e r s a r e Indian Tami ls . Although the a n c e s t o r s 
of both t h e coromuiities h a i l e d from I n d i a , t h e y speak d i f f e r e n t 
l anguages , have t h e i r own d i s t i n c t i v e c u l t u r e s and fol low 
d i f f e r e n t f a i t h s . The i s l a n d i s a smal l one. Two communities. 
wishing t o preserve t h e i r individual i d a i t i t i e s have, 
however, over the centur ies been in c o n f l i c t . 
The main problem concerning the Indian Tamils was the 
problem of c i t i z e n s h i p , as they were d e c i t i z e n i s e d in 1948, 
Simply/ they were asked t o l eave the i s l a n d / which was a big 
i n j u s t i c e towards them. Nowhere in the world/ have a vtoole 
people grandparents, parents , youth, chi ldren - been t o l d 
that they must get out . These people have l i v e d there / not 
for some few years but for two or three generat ions; they 
know no other p l a c e . When the Sri Lankan Tamils a l so became 
vict ims of a t r o c i t i e s of Sri Lankan p o l i c i e s / the whole 
Tamil speaking community ( including both the Sri Lankan Tamils 
and the Tamils of Indian origin) Joined hands. The degrada~ 
t i o n of man in Sri Lanka began as a r i f t within the instrument 
as between the res ident S inhalese and the 'imported Tamils ' , 
The b e a u t i f u l , pearl-shaped i s land republ ic of Sri Lanka i s 
now torn apart by internal c o n f l i c t s i n t e r s e c t i n g at severa l / 
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p o l i t i c a l / geographical and emotional p o i n t s . What exac t ly 
has l e d t o t h i s s t a t e ? To understand and analyse t h i s complex 
s i tv iat ion/ i t i s necessary t o understand the country's 
1 . Menon, N.C. ,"Solving the Sri Lankan Tangle/' in 
The Hindustan Times, 12 November 1986, 
2. Sengvpta, Bhabani, "Eyeless in Lanka" The Hindusij^an 
Times, 11 August 1989. 
h i s t o r i c a l / demographical and geographical c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , 
A. Physical Featureg' • 
The i s land of Sri Lanka l i e s in the Indian Ocean 20 
mi les off the Southern coas t of India between the northern 
l a t i t u d e s 5^55' and 9 50* and the eastern Icaagitudes 79 42' 
and 8 l ° 5 2 ' . The t o t a l land area i s 65# 609.88 square 
k i lometres . The maximum length of the i s l and i s 353 kilometres 
and at i t s widest point i t measures 183 ki lometres . Lying some 
400 mi le s north of the equator, the i s l a n d i s a detached 
port ion of the mainland of India , a part of i t s vas t southern 
p l a t e a u . This nearness t o India has a f f e c t e d considerably 
the course of her h i s tory as i t has opened her for the 
inf luence of currents of thoughts and f e e l i n g s from India 
and has provided her ru l ing dynas t i e s . Ubfortunately, she 
had t o pay for t h e s e , by frequent invasions v^ich grea t ly 
damaged her material c i v i l i z a t i o n . 
The economy of the coui try i s based on agr i cu l ture . 
Rice i s the main food crop. Since t e a , rubber and coconut 
are grown e x t a i s i v e l y , Sri Lanka i s a leading exporter of 
t h e s e commodities. Due to the c l o s e prox in i ty of the two 
n a t i o n s , whereby India , being an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nation 
1. Navasivayam, S . , The Leg i s la tures of Cevlon. p . 1, 
among the world's developing covjntries# is a convenient 
source of si^jply for many of the items t h a t Sr i Lanka 
needs. 
S t r a t e g i c a l l y a l s o , S r i Lanka is very important. 
Dr. p. Saran wr i t e s , "Ceylon i s half way house between the 
East and the West. I t s pos i t ion in the Indian Ocean has 
proved favourable and today Colombo is an important port of 
ca l l for a l l steamships t ha t cross the Indian ocean from 
East t o West and vice versa via the Suez Canal". Mr. Senanayake 
in his statement on defence in the House of Representatives 
a l so r e i t e r a t e s , "we are in a spec ia l ly dangerous posi t ion 
because we a re in one of the s t r a t e g i c highways of the world. 
The covntry which captures Ceylon could dominate the Indian 
Ocean". 
B. H i s to r i ca l Retrospect; 
The complexities of the i s l a n d ' s e thn ic conf l ic t go 
deep i n to the h i s t o ry . "By whom Ceylon was o r i g ina l l y 
peopled is a quest ion which is very much involved in obscurity/ 
1. Saran, P.* Government and p o l i t i c s of Sr i Lanka, 
(New Delhi , 1982) , p . 2. 
2. Jacob, Lucy M., Sr i Lanka t From Dominion t o Republic, (New Delhi, 1973), p . 23. 
and we fear , can never be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y solved". S r i 
Lanka's population had from the beginning tvioethnic streams, 
the Tamils and the Sinhalese . The Sinhalese came from the 
north and the east of India during the t h i r d and the fourth 
centur ies B.C. About the same time or perhaps a l i t t l e 
l a t e r , t he r e was emigration, in per iod ic waves, of t h e 
Dravadian people from the South of India . S t i l l e a r l i e r , 
t he re were people who had come in from East and West APia, 
S r i Lanka being a v i t a l point in the sea route l inking South-
eas t Asia with the eastern mediterranean. 
Buddhist legends and mythology have the s to ry of 
pr ince Vijaya, who founded dynasty of Sinhalese Klxigs, 
•Sinhala ' being the name of a powerful t r i b e of the ear ly 
In do-Aryan Immigrants frcm northern Ind ia , who went to Ceylon 
in the f i f t h century B.C. The Indian l i n k gained a special 
s a n c t i t y when prince Mahendra, son of Emperor Ashok, took 
the message of the Buddha t o Sri Lanka. The Buddhist 
chronic le 'KAHAVANSA', from which Sr i Lanka's ea r ly h i s to ry 
is t r a ced , sanc t i f i ed t h i s a l l . Also t r aced t o Mahavansa i s 
the growth of a second current of immigrants from India , 
t h i s time from the South. According to i t , in t h e second 
1. Chi t ty , Simon Casie, Cevlon Gazetteer . New Delhi, 1989 
( f i r s t published in Ceylon in 1834), p . 51. 
century B.C., Tamil invaders reached Southwards and conquered 
the Anuradhapura Kingdoiti. 
History during the subsequent centur ies was different 
in regard to Indo-Sri Lanka con tac t s . The break in the l inks 
with nor th India meant for the Sinhalese a cer ta in measure of 
cu l t u r a l i s o l a t i o n . Now, t h e i r language and t h e i r re l ig ion 
were t h e i r own t o guard and to preserve without any kind of 
backing frcm abroad. This s i t u a t i o n tended to promote signs 
of Sinhalese e thnocen t r i c i t y . This impulse was possibly 
s t r e s s e d by an awareness t h a t the Tamils of the northern areas 
could, because of proximity, continue t h e i r l inks with South 
Ind ia . For the Tamils, although smaller in number and with 
extremely l imi ted na tu ra l resources, t h i s l a t en t source of 
s t rength tended to build for them a sense of confidaice to 
withstand any possible assau l t from the South of Sri Lanka. 
Colonial Pepio^: 
Against such po la r iza t ion of the co\xitry# t h e entry 
of the European c o l o n i a l i s t s created an a l together new s i t u a -
t i o n . The Portuguese were the f i r s t to come from the West, 
in 1505, followed by the Dutch in 1658, The Dutch were 
1. Ramaswamy, p . , New Del^i and Sr i Lanka i Pour Decades 
of Polj.tics and DiplOfnacv, (New Del h i . 1^87^ . p . 5. 
invi ted t o Ceylcjn by the able and ambitious King of K^ndy* 
Rajasinyha - I I (183 5-1887), who had been brought up in t h e 
Portuguese t r a d i t i o n , but who had not received frcrn the 
Portuguese a l l he wanted."^ The Br i t i sh came during ear ly 
19th century. The impact generated by these colonial powers 
brought about many changes. For the f i r s t time the Br i t i sh 
brought the i s land uider a unified s t r u c t u r e and cen t ra l ized 
a d n i n i s t r a t i c o . This tended t o i n t eg ra t e Tamil areas i n t o 
the governmental s t r uc tu r e of a Uhited Ceylon. On the other 
hand, unlike in India , local government i n s t i t u t i o n s were 
slow t o develop and often almost noo-ex i s ten t . Thus, a t 
independence, new ru le r s inher i t ed a workable machinery for 
governing the whole country, while the minori ty et^mic and 
r e l ig ious groups found no i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework within 
which t o organise themselves, even in the areas where they 
were dominaTifc. The B r i t i s h f a i l e d to prepare t h e nat ico for 
s e l f - r u l e when they l e f t i t in 1948 by not recognising 
adequately enough i t s separateness in terms of nat ional and 
cu l tu ra l components. And successive governments In free Sri 
Lanka ccnipounded the problem by ignoring the r e a l i t i e s of 
the c o u i t r y ' s composition exact ly as the Br i t i sh had done. 
Sr i Lanka, today, i s a continuat ion of the p o l i t i c a l system, 
the B r i t i s h l e f t behind. 
1. Col l ins , Charles, publ ic Adninis,;tyat^op In Cevlon, p . 6. 
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The f i r s t immigrants went t o Sri Lanka some 150 years 
ago , when the B r i t i s h transformed the i s l a n d ' s subs i s tence 
a g r i c u l t u r e . The Br i t i sh found the S inhalese smart, handsome 
and companionable, but so far as t h e i r performance in terms 
of t h e i r work output was concerned/ they were i n d i f f e r e n t and 
unaccountable. The Tamils, on the other hand» were c l ever , 
hard-working and dependable and, there fore , e f f i c i e n t 
employees. So, the Tamils were brought i n , f i r s t by the 
B r i t i s h as adminis trat ive personnel because they were be t ter 
educated and tra ined in bureaucratic "clerkdom** and had no 
l o c a l axe t o grind and were thus no s e c u r i t y r i s k to the Raj. 
Secondly, thousands of Tamils were btrought in as t e a garden 
labour because once again , they had f i e l d experience in 
2 
Ind ia ' s South. Mr. Gopal Gandhi wri tes in h is novel 'Refuge', 
"Defeated by t h e i r gamble with the monsoons at home, they 
decided t o gamble with t h e i r fortunes overseas",^ 
1. Ramaswamy, P . , o p . c i t . , p . 103» 
2. Mencai, N.C. , "Solving the Sri Lanka Tangle", in T*he 
Hindustan Times. 12 November 1986. 
3 . Gandhi, Gopal, Refuge (Novel) . De lh i , 1989, p . 3 . 
This novel i s based on encoiwters with a large number 
of P lantat ion workers during w r i t e r ' s four years? s tay 
in Kandy between 1978 and 1982, as F i r s t Secretary in 
the Ass i s tan t High Commission of Ind ia . 
Hence the p lan ta t ion eccnomy of CeylOD was bu i l t upon 
the basis of an a l l i a n c e of Br i t i sh cap i ta l and Indian Tamil 
labour. These develcptnents l ed to an economic migrat ion. 
Economic Migration roust be understood as applying not only 
to the migrant workers themselves but a l s o t o members of t h e i r 
2 families accompanying them. 
In the ear ly years , the numbers ranged between 30,CX)0 
and 60,000 including women and chi ldren . But when the coffee 
p l an t a t i ons became well-organised* the system of ' indentured 
labour*, by which the p l an te r s entered i n t o contracts with the 
people who worked as agents t o b r i i ^ in labour from India , 
came i n t o ex is tence . These agents got fees from both s i d e s . 
I t was only in t h e l a t e sevent ies and e igh t ies of 19th coatury, 
when the coffee p lan ta t ions were destroyed by a b l igh t , t h a t 
Ceylon turned to t ea and the flow of Indian labour increased 
and became be t t e r organised. By 1931, the Indian Tamil immi-
grants outnvrobered the Sr i Lankan Tamils, and together , the 
two Tamil groins comprised some 2594 of the country 's population. 
1. Jacob, LucyM., S r i Lanka : Frcm pominion t o Republic, (New Delhi, 1973) , p . 12. 
2. In t e rna t iona l Mi aralpion. Studies and Reports News 
Se r i e s , No. 54, lX,(y , Geneva J35"9^ p, 2. 
3 . Raroaswamy, p . , o p . c i t . , p . 35. 
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Soon the Br i t i sh began the colooial game of playing 
one sect ion off against the other to ensure t h e i r hegemcny. 
The most successful way t o a l i n e a t e a groi^) of people i s 
t o get them t o administer another and more indigenous groip. 
That was p r e c i s e l y what the Br i t i sh managed t o do in S r i 
Lanka. When r i s i n g population began to put pressure on ava i -
l ab l e jobs* the outs iders began to s tand out in greater re l ie f / 
adding to the resaitment of the local populatico« After a l l , 
an economic base for psychological reac t ions has not been an 
uncommon phenomenon throughout the world. The colonial period 
saw the emergence of a s t ronger sense of e thnic Iden t i ty 
among both Sinhalese and Tamils, 
Though i s l and ' s economy changed remarkably with t i ^ 
p l an t a t i on economy/ but soc ia l s c i e n t i s t reviewed the h i s t o -
r i c a l impact of t h i s s i t u a t i o n as a "nasty legacy which/ 
despi te numerous commcn t i e s and i n t e r e s t s , has v i t i a t e d 
Indo-Sri Lanka r e l a t i o n s without r e s p i t e ever s ince indqpen-
dence. Indian emigration had assumed the s i z e of a world 
problem on account of B r i t i s h imperial i n t e r e s t s " . 
There are two more aspects of the colonial impact. 
y.4gs.ti,Y* by the twent ie th century, education in English had 
JbijS., pp, 3^-37, 
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become the key factor for access to the higher posts in 
governnent s e r v i c e s . Because of numerous Chris t ian mission 
schools , teaching in English medium in the Jaffna peninsula, 
the S r i Lankan Tamils secured a lead in t h e i r knowledge of 
the English language. Secondly, the process of c o n s t i t u t i o -
nal development in the n ine teenth and twent ie th centur ies 
had i t s impact on the e l i t e among the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils. 
The evidence of Sinhala-Tamil differences were mani-
fest well before and during t h e time of the t r a n s f e r of power, 
yet , unlike the r e s t of B r i t i s h South A3ia, the comtry 
suffered no violence . The new s t a t e emerged in an atmosphere 
of ccmparative peace and harmony, t o the extent tha t Sr i 
Lanka came to be re fe r red t o as the 'model colony*. During 
na t iona l movement in Ceylcn, indeed the Hindu Tamils were 
in minor i ty , but they were advised by Indian natiora l i s t s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by Nehru, t o join hands with the Sinhalese 
Buddhist majori ty t o present a u i i t ed front against the 
Br i t i sh t o win the ind^endence . 
C. Demographic and Geographic C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
Most of the South Asian Sta tes have mul t i -e thn ic 
charac te r . Many of the e thno - l i ngu i s t i c groi;^s which co-exist 
1. Pandey, B.N. South And S9uth-east Asia, 1945'1979sfcob^fms 
and P o l i t i c s (London, 1980) , pp . 12-13. 
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in these s t a t e s have t h e i r own customs and t r a d i t i o n s / which 
by and la rge / guide t h e i r l i f e s t y l e s and influence t h e i r 
behavioural norms. The i n t e r - e thn i c growqp cleavage being 
bas i ca l ly p o l i t i c a l , the e thnic conf l ic t is mainly the compe-
t i t i o n for power-sharing and i t s exerc i se . The continued 
neglect and mishandling of the i n i t i a l demands for l i n g u i s t i c 
accommodation and employment avenues often turn the autono-
mist i n to secess ion i s t which r e t a rds the nat ion-bui lding 
process . In South Asia, the case of ffftcdHptfaseMi Pakistan, 
in which the p o l i t i c a l demands for autonomy of East-pakistan 
was u l t imate ly driven by repress ion to secess ion, i s an 
, 1 example . 
P lura l S t ruc ture of the Society; 
S r i Lanka has a p l u r a l soc ie ty , a blend of se l f -
aware communities dis t inguished from one another along e thnic , 
r e l i g ious or l i n g u i s t i c grounds. An island-wide nat ional 
2 
sense i s yet to be e f fec t ive ly evolved" . 
S r i Lanka has a t o t a l population-of 16,755,000 persons. 
This populat ion i s s p l i t i n to separa te e thn ic , l i n g u i s t i c 
1. Sahdevan/ P. & Nayak, S . C , "Ethnic competition and 
Nation Building in Sr i Lanka* in Dharmdasani M.D (ed.) 
Sri Lanka :; An Is land in Cr is i s (varanasi , 1988), p . 40, 
2. saran P . , Government and P o l i t i c s of Sri Lanka. (New 
Delhi, 1982)/ p . 6« 
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and r e l i g i o u s canmini t les . I t Is s p l i t \2p as follows: 
SlnhalBS 
Sr i Lankan Tamils 
Indian Tamils 
Muslims (Moors) 
Others 
Total 
12.S4 
5.58; 
Percentage 
74% 
lesi 
73C 
1% 
1CD% 
population 
12,398,700 
3 ,015 ,900 
1,172,850 
167,550 
16,755,000 
The Sinhalese , who form the major i ty , and a re p r i n -
c i p a l l y Buddhist and speak Sinhalese , an In do'European language, 
could fur ther be divided in to Kandyan and Low covntry Sinhalese, 
a d i s t i n c t i o n which arose out of the d i f fe ren t r a t e s at which 
these two communities developed during the colonial era . The 
l a rges t community, the low-country Sinhalese , refji;:esent the 
most subject t o European influence. The majority of Chr is -
t i a n s belong t o t h i s community. I t s geographical spread i s 
from North Western province t o southern province. A large par t 
of them l i v e under urban inf luence. The I^odyan Sinhalese are 
1. Mairo, David (ed) Chambers world Gazetter;An A-Z 
Geographical Information, w. fc R. Chambers L td . , 
Cambridge University Press , 1988, p . 611. 
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those l i v ing and inh ib i t ing the inland area of the Kandyan 
Kingdom which remained independent vaatil 1815. They are 
almost e n t i r e l y Buddhist and r u r a l . The Tamils a re Hindu and 
speak Tamil. They a l so could further be divided in to Sr i 
Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils. S r i Lankan Tamils believe 
t h a t t h e i r ancestors pre-dated t he Sinhalese se t t lers . These 
ea r ly immigrant indigenous Tamils who have idoa t i f i ed Noirthem 
and Eastern provinces as t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l home lands belong 
to the country in the same way as t he Sinhalese . The Indian 
Tamils were f i r s t t ranspor ted t o Sr i Lanka from India when 
Br i ta in ru led both the countr ies (between 1850-1940) . They 
a re conca i t ra ted in Central areas of Sr i Lanka, and a re the 
l e a s t p r iv i l eged of any community. 
According t o the 1981 census, Tamils, including 
persons of Indian o r ig in , c o n s t i t u t e 9 5 . ' ^ of the population 
in Jaffna, 89.8?6 in Mullai thivu, 75,2% in Vavixiia, 7256 in 
Bat t icaloa and 63.9% in Manwar. In the Nuwa^a Eliya d i s t r i c t 
of the Central province the Indian Tamils comprise 4 7.336 
while the Sinhalese a re 35.9%, This i s the only d i s t r i c t 
where the Indian Tamils have t h e i r highest concentrat ion, 
2 
though they spread a l l over the i s l and . S r i Lanka has a small 
1. Jn>p, James, Sr i Lanka t Third World Democracy (Londoh, 1978) , pp . 31-32. 
2. Ali Sayed Ashfaq, Indian Overseas (Bhopal, 1984), p . 77. 
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but s ign i f i can t Miislinj population a l s o , categorised in to the 
Ceylon Moors, the Indian Moors ana the Malays. The Ceylon 
Moors claim t o be the descendants of the Arab-traders . The 
Indian Moors are South Indian t r a d e r s . The Malay Muslim t race 
t h e i r ancestry to South East Asia, The res idual populaticn 
cons i s t s mostly of Burghesc/ Dutch and Portuguese, 
Since Sinhalese-Buddhists a re p o l i t i c a l l y and soc ia l ly 
divided/ and are not sure of t h e i r own s t reng th and cohesion, 
they tend t o regard the non-Buddhist m i n o r i t i e s , espec ia l ly 
the Ceylon and Indian Tamils and Roman Catho l ics , as a greater 
t h r e a t than they ac tua l ly a r e . 
Another element vhich promoted the p l u r a l i s t i c charac-
t e r of Sr i Lankan soc ie ty , i s the r e l ig ion based division of 
ccmmuaities. Many invasions and foreign penetra t ions have l e f t 
S r i Lanka with a highly complex communal s t r u c t u r e . I t is the 
only country in t h e world with s u b s t a n t i a l representa t ion 
from the four major r e l i g ions of Buddhism, Hinduism, Chr i s t i a -
2 
n i t y and Islam. 
1. Wilson, A . J . , p o l i t i c s of Sri Lanka t 1947-1979 (2nd 
e d i t i o n ) , London, 1979, p . 58. 
2, Jupp* James, o p , c i t » , p . 32, " 
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Population of Sri Lanka by r e l i g i cn is as follows; 
A l l r e l i g i o n s 
B u d d h i s t s 
Hindus 
C h r i s t i a n s 
Musi ims 
P e r c e n t a g e 
10C% 
69% 
1S6 
^/i 
&i> 
p c p u l a t i c n 
1 6 , 7 5 5 , 0 0 0 
1 1 , 5 6 0 , 9 5 0 
2 , 5 1 3 , 2 5 0 
1 ,340 ,400 
1 ,340 ,400 
This shows tha t Buddhism i s t he r e l i g i c n of majority 
in Sr i Lanka, followed by Hinduism, Chr i s t i an i t y and Islam, 
9 2% of the Sinhalese a re Buddhist, 904 of Tamils are Hindus 
and 9C% of the Chris t ians a re Roman Cathol ic . In other words 
nine out of ten Sinhalese are Buddhist; nine out of ten Tamils 
are Hindus; almost a l l Moors a re Muslims; and Chr i s t i ans , 
although cons t i tu t ing the majority of t he Eurasian category, 
2 fonn subs t an t i a l minor i t i e s in t he o ther e thnic ca tegor ies . 
Whereas in India Buddhism emerged as an urban re l ig ion of a 
merchant-plebein gro^p, in S r i Lanka, almost from i t s inception, 
i t became predominantly a peasant r e l ig ion , and p e r s i s t e d in 
1. Mvnro, David (ed.) Chambers Wor;Ld Gazetteer; An A-z 
geographical Information, W fc R, Chambers Ltd. # Cambridge 
Universi ty p r e s s , 1988, p , 611. 
2. phadnis, lanmila, ReJ.iqj.on and p o l i t i c s in Sri Lanka 
(New Delhi , 19 76) , pp. 3-6. 
3 . Saran, P . , 9 p « c i t . , p . 5, 
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Sr i Lanka even a f t e r Buddhism had l o s t much of i t s influence 
in Ind ia . ^ 
As in many other independent 5'hird World c o i n t r i e s , 
the scenar io has a r e l i g ious dimex^ion t o i t . I t is a pa r t 
of l oca l h i s to ry t h a t Buddhism has p lace of p r i d e . Tamils 
are not only h i s t o r i c enemies but a l s o pose r e l ig ious and 
cu l t u r a l t h r e a t s . The paranoid bel ief t h a t "Buddhism is in 
2 danger" is often u t te red by Sinhalese. Sadly* the Buddhism 
in Sr i Lanka appears t o be not of the "Ahlmsa Paramo Dharma" 
but of a more v iolent mutation. 
Caste Systemt 
Another factor responsible for the heterogeneous nature 
in t h e Sri Lankan population i s the preva i l ing caste system. 
Since no census of Sr i Lankan cas tes has been taken in t h i s 
century, the s i z e of the cas te grovps can only be estimated. 
However, i t i s general ly argued t h a t the Sinhalese cas te 
s t r u c t u r e i s dominated* h i e r a r ch i ca l l y and numerically by the 
Qoyigama (cu l t iva tors ) caste* which comprise aboiib one-half 
of Sinhalese populat ion. Other cas tes a re of lower s t a t u s . 
1. Baxter* Craig and others* Govemmept and ppj.itic5y ±n 
S r i ;.anka ( Lahore -* 19 %B) * pp . 3-6 . 
2. JiJ^p* James* o p . c i t . . p . 36. 
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These are the Karawa (flsherm«i) , the Salagaroa (cinnamon 
peeler) and the Durawa (toddy tapper) . 
The Sr i Lanka Tamil cas te s t r u c t u r e is a l s o aominated 
by the c u l t i v a t o r c a s t e , known as " v e l l a l a " , which controls the 
land, economy and p o l i t i c s and enjoys more Opportunities in 
education and employment. Other important cas tes include 
Koriyar (dsmestic servants) , the Karayar and the Mukkuvar 
2 (f ishing castes) . 
AS far as Indian Tamils a re concerned, a majority of 
them belong t o lower ca s t e . But t h e Indian commercial grov:qp 
mainly from "Chet t iar" community has earned thanselves si;qpe-
r i o r s t a t u s among a l l the Indian Tamil c a s t e s . The s t ruc tu re 
of cas te d i s t inc t ions in SinVelese areas i s much looser than 
3 
i t i s in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka. Untouchability i s much 
m ore canmon among the Tamils than i t i s among the Sinhalese. 
* * * * 
1. Baxter, Cra ig , op.cjL^., p , 307. 
2. Sahdevan, p./Nayak, S.C. "Ethnic Competition and Nation 
Building in Sri Lanka" in Oharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) , Syi 
Lanka ; An Is land in Cris is^ (varanasi , 1988) , p . 48. 
3 . saran . P . , Government and P o l i t i c s ip Spi Lanka (New Delhi, 
1982) , p . 7. 
2 
Chapter - 2 
THE POLITICAL PROBLEM ; CITIZENSHIP 
Though t h e problems of Ind ian migrants# viio i nc lude 
P l a n t a t i o n workers of Ind ian o r i g i n a r e d i f f e r o i t from t h e 
problem of S r i Lankan Tamils* but s i n c e both have jo ined 
hands for commcxi cause t h e problems in genera l cover t h e 
Tamil speak ing community as a whole. In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e main 
p o l i t i c a l problem of t h e Indian mig ran t s i s t he l a c k of 
* 
c i t i z ensh ip or of s t a t e l e s s n e s s . Other e t t n i c problems l ike 
language* education* emploionent and the set t lement of 
* In theory , t h i s problem is now almost s e t t l e d . 
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Sinhalese in Tamil dominated areas a re of cxucial relevance 
t o t he Tamil community as a whole. 
Countries which have succeeded in creat ing an enduring 
base for genuine na t ional unity in s i t ua t i on s imilar t o Sri 
Lanka have done so only by evolving a ao\xx6 framework of 
i n t e r - r a c i a l j u s t i c e . The f i r s t i s the sharing of p o l i t i c a l 
power and governmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This has played a key 
ro l e in s i t u a t i o n s where groups have t e r r i t o r i a l bases. The 
second is the opportunity for economic development which 
provides adequate growth and employment to each e thnic gro\;p. 
The t h i r d i s the environment for preserving and promoting the 
cu l tu ra l i n t e g r i t y of each g ro i^ . Exactly* the main issues 
which have divided the Sinhalese and the Sr i Lankan Tamil 
commuiities f a l l in to these broad ca t ego r i e s . Several wri ters 
have d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y made suggestions concerning the 
FACTORS t h a t have led t o the r i f t and the nature of the r i f t 
i t s e l f . For ins tance, Donald E. Stnith emphasizes tha t the 
i n t e r a c t i o n of p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i c o has led t o the r i f t in 
Sr i Lanka. Michael Roberts, on the other hand seems t o place 
great emphasis on h i s t o r i c a l f ac to r s . He has emphasised the 
1. De Si lva , C.R., "The Sinhalese - Tamil Rif t in s r i Lanka" 
in Wilson, A . J . , The Sta tes of South Asia (London, 19 78), 
pp. 170-171. 
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ro le of the Sinl^aiese ccsncept of Sinhadipa and Dhatnmadlpa 
emphasising how these old ideas came t o be fused with the 
western concept of a n a t i o n - s t a t e during the colonial e ra . 
He has pointed out t h a t the Sinhalese use the same word for 
race and n a t i o n a l i t y . I t is d i f f i c u l t to argue t h a t perceptions 
inhe r i t ed from h i s to ry do not cont r ibu te to e thnic tens ions . 
Efforts to underplay the factors of h i s to ry and c u l -
t u r a l t r a d i t i o n and to bring economic factors t o the fore 
have been made by seme rad ica l w r i t e r s . Marxist and other 
Left wing wri t ings on the subject emphasise tha t the conf l ic t 
over the o f f i c i a l language i s sue had more t o do with economic 
advantages, e spec ia l ly for the Sinhalese* who were educated 
in t h e i r v a l i d i t y in t h i s argument but proponent of t h i s 
theory often tend t o undervalvte the s t rength of ethnic and 
r e l ig ious l o y a l i t i e s and to argue that e thnic conf l ic t will 
disappear with the advent of a s o c i a l i s t s t a t e . Another 
explanation for the factors which cause the r i f t was advanced 
by James Manor, who suggests t h a t the f a i l u r e of p o l i t i c i a n s 
on both s ides t o a r r i ve a t a p o l i t i c a l accoinroodatioo i s due 
In p a r t t o t he lack of p o l i t i c a l in tegra t ion in Sri Lanka.^ 
P o l i t i c a l in tegra t ion is defined as the establishment of a 
two way connection between the e l i t e and the mass. 
1. i b i ^ ^ 
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I t might be s t a t e d t h a t the fac tors which crea ted and 
widened the Sinhalese-Tamil r i f t s ince independence were 
ccxnplex. History and t r a d i t i o n r e su l t i ng in in te r -g ro ip 
suspicions have provided some ba r r i e r s t o accommodation. The 
slow growth of economy worsened tensions among the groups 
seeking to share l imi ted wealth and resources . The weakness 
of the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e and of p o l i t i c a l organization no 
doubt contr ibuted t o increase the c o n f l i c t . Mul t i - r ac i a l , 
mu l t i - r e l i g ious and mv^lti-lingual Sri Lanka had known free and 
fa i r e lec t ion with universal adult franchise s ince 1931. But 
soon a f t e r independence Sinhala nationalism d i rec ted i t s 
h o s t i l i t y at the Tamil minor i ty , perhaps out of a perceived 
fear of being swamped by India , the big neighbour across the 
Palk s t r a i t s . Whatever the reasons for Sinhaia bel l igerence , 
the f i r s t group t o be vict imised was the immigrant labour, 
mostly Tarn it-speaking, the Br i t i sh had brought in from India to 
run the i s l a n d ' s p l an t a t i ons . They were disfranchised and 
deprived of c i t i z ensh ip . Then the a t tack was turned on the 
e thnic Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces. And 
from 19 56, the drive for Sinhala-Buddhist svpreroacy was 
fur ther aggravated through l i n g u i s t i c , educat ional , r e l i g i o u s , 
land colonisat ion and other p o l i c i e s , a l l designed t o margi-
n a l i s e the Tamils. 
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CltizenshipL 
The f i r s t major conf l i c t t h a t arose in the newly 
independait nat ion was over c i t i z ensh ip of the Indian Tamils. 
The soulbury Const i tu t ion (which was drafted by Lord Soulbury 
in 1948) did not define c i t i z e i s h i p of Ceylcm. when the 
Br i t i sh l e f t / the i s land had Sinhalaj , Ceylcm Tamils, Indian 
Tamils, Burghers, Ceylon Moors (Muslims) and Tamil-speaking 
Muslims.'^ The majori ty of the i s l a n d ' s population was Sinhala 
on e thnic and language l i ne s and Buddhist by r e l i g i o n . 
Indeed, Buddhism is very much iden t i f i ed with Sinhala e thn ic i ty 
in S r i Lanka. Kunari Jayawardene, a rad ica l h i s to r ian who is 
a Sinhala says t h i s ideology assumed tha t the i s land was the 
land of the Sinhala-Buddhists and# there fore , a l l other 
groups inhabi t ing i t were a l i ens out to exploi t i t s people. 
2 The Sinhala-Buddhist ideology flowed from three preroisess 
The Sinhaias were the o r ig ina l and t r u e inhabi tants of the 
i s l and and the others were usurpers. Secondly/ the Sinhala-
Buddhists see Sri Lanka as a blockaded i s land with no one 
oxitside t o look for he lp . Thi rd ly , Sinhalese believed t h a t 
they have a spec ia l r e l a t ionsh ip t o Buddhism/ having been 
chosen and ordered by the Buddha t o p ro t ec t the f a i t h . 
1. Mohan Ram, S r i Lanka ; The Fractured I s l and , (New Delhi, 
1989) / p . 36. 
2. Ibi,^, / p . 82. 
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Due to these reasons, the l a rges t non-Sinhala groxap, 
t he Tamils, were seen as an immediate t h r e a t t o the Sinhala 
i d e n t i t y . Anong the ea r ly enactments of t he mul t i - e thn ic , but 
Sinhala-doroinated, United National p a r t y ' s (IKP) government 
were the Acts to deprive most res idents of Indian or igin of 
t h e i r r igh t t o c i t i z ensh ip and franchise . Sr i Lanka's 
p o l i t i c a l leadership contended t h a t despi te t h e i r Icng r e s i -
dence in the island* the immigrants did not belong to i t and 
had a l i v e i n t e r e s t in the couatry of t h e i r or ig in and were, 
t he re fo re , a l i e n s . But India thought ttiey were or ought to 
be Sri Lankan n a t i o n a l s . 
Thus very ear ly in l i f e of the new s ta te* three laws 
came into force : the Ceylonese c i t i zensh ip Act of 1948, 
t he Indian and Pakis tan i Residents ( c i t i z e n s h ^ ) Act of 1949 
and the par i iamaitary Elect ions (Amendment) Act of 19 49. All 
t h ree taken together e f f ec t ive ly removed the vast majority of 
Indian Tamils from the e l e c t o r a l r e g i s t e r s . A mil l ion 
Tamil p lan ta t ion workers who had t o i l e d for the p rosper i ty of 
the i s l and for more than a century were disfranchised. 
Indeed they were robbed of t h e i r bas ic hunan r i g h t s and rendered 
s t a t e l e s s . The Act of 1948 provided t h a t c i t i zensh ip would 
1. Subramanya, T.R., "problem of S t a t e l e s s in Intemat icaia l 
Law" in In te rna t iona l s t u d i e s , \tol. 26, No. 4 , Oct.-Dec. 
1989, p . 346. 
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be aeterminea e i t h e r by descent or by s t r ingen t conditions 
of r e g i s t r a t i o n . There was no provis ion for c i t i zensh ip by-
b i r t h or by v i r t u e of the country 's rnanbership of the 
B r i t i s h Commonwealth. In t h i s way, the Acts of 19 48 and 1949 
had created a very d i f ferent s i t u a t i o n . The people of Indian 
o r ig in in Ceylon had become divided in to different categories 
such as c i t i zQis by descent and by r e g i s t r a t i o n / people 
holding permanent residence permits and those with temporary 
res idence permits e t c . Both the Indian and the S r i LanJcan 
governments a l so found tha t b«cause of t r ave l r e s t r i c t i o n s , 
the problem of " i l l i c i t immigration" e i t h e r way had a l so 
developed. 
Further* the Senanayake government disfranchised the 
• s t a t e l e s s ' immigrants, through the Pariiaraeatary Blections 
(Amendnent) Act of 1949, r e s t r i c t i n g voting r i g h t s to 
c i t i z e n s (They were re- f ranchised only fn 1989) . I t was dane 
because the IKP government feared t h a t the Indian Tamils, if 
allowed t o continue as a p o l i t i c a l force might someday join 
hands with the indigenous Tamils t o c rea te a problem for the 
major i ty oommvnity. 
U Ramaswamy, P . , New Delhi and Sr i Lanka t Four Decades 
of p o l i t i c s and Diplomacy/ (New Delhi, 19 87) , p . 50» 
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The p lan ta t ion labour haa voted a t every e l ec t ion . 
100,000 of them had been r eg i s t e red when adul t franchise was 
introduced in 1931 and the nunber rose t o 145,000 In 1936. 
A 1946 order had provided t h a t every Br i t i sh subject res ident 
in t h e is land for s ix months o r who was otherwise qua l i f i ed 
could vote and hold of f ice . But now non-ci t izens could not 
vote . Therefore, the proporticwi of the Tamils, who had 33% 
of the voting power in t h e l e g i s l a t u r e in 1948, had come down 
2 t o 2054, The Sinhalese wc« a two-thi rds majority in parliament 
rendering the Tamils helpless and unable t o block Sinhala 
p o l i c i e s af fec t ing them. 
L^to 1950, there were seven Indian members from the 
Kandyan p lan ta t ion areas in the Sr i Lanka parl iament. The 
Indian and Pakis tan i c i t i zensh ip Act 1949 and the e lect ion rules 
came t he r ea f t e r depriving p lan ta t ion labour of Indian origin 
3 
of t h e i r f ranchise . The following figures show the ef fec t : 
1. Mohan Ram, op. c ^ t . , pp . 36-37, 
2. I b i d . . p . 82. 
3 . Ramaswamy, p . , o p . c i t . , p . 237. 
27 
s. 
NO. 
1. 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7. 
C o n s t i t uencies 
(Kandyan Area) 
Nuwara E l iya 
Talawakele 
Katagele 
Nawalap i t iya 
Maskeliya 
Heputala 
Badulla 
NO. of v o t e r s in 
1947 e l e c t i o n s 
24,295 
19 ,299 
17,092 
22,580 
24,427 
11,123 
43,396 
No. of v o t e r s 
a f t e r t h e r e -
v i s i o n of 19 50 
9,279 
2,914 
7,738 
9,935 
8,691 
7,049 
28,134 
No. of P lan -
t a t i o n Tamil 
v o t e r s a f t e r 
r e v i s i o n of 
1950 
n i l 
244 
137 
675 
203 
322 
1,291 
There was no more any question of Indians ( s e t t l e r s 
of Indian descent) represent ing Kandyan Sinhalese in t he Sr i 
Lankan parl iament, mese measures were openly r a c i s t . The 
Indian Tamils were immediate t a r g e t . The statements made by 
e lec ted o f f i c i a l s a t t h i s time increased t h e fears of the 
m i n o r i t i e s . 
Gopal Gandhi writes in his novel 'Refuge' , " the i r 
disfranchisement" father Gio sa id , " i s unbelievable. I t i s 
indefens ible . This comt ry won i t s freedom in 1947 and 
within two years denied t h a t very freedom t o almost a t en th of 
i t s pecu la t ion . Hundreds of thousands were made s t a t e l e s s and 
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they are asked t o go t o India . To Indi^lwhy not t o 
Timbuctoo? What i s India to them? A d i s t an t memory of 
granc%)arents. Are there many instances of such a l l rouid 
deprivat ion among peoples?" These Tamils (both S r i Lankan 
and Indian) have played a c ruc ia l r o l e in the improvement 
of the economy of the is land and they would n a t u r a l l y l ike 
2 
to l i v e the re as fu l l c i t i z e n s . 
The Indian Tamil c i t i zensh ip issue did not a t t ha t time 
c rea te a r i f t between the respect ive in f luen t i a l sec t icns of 
Sr i Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese- The Tamil congress led by 
G.G. pounambalam continued t o work as p a r t of the government. 
But gradually the Sri Lankan Tamils feared tha t i t woxild 
extend to them in some other form. Consequently, a sect ion 
of the Tamil congress broke away under the leadership of S.J.V. 
Chelavanayakam and formed the I lankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi 
(in s t r i c t t r a n s l a t i o n , the Ceylon Tamil S ta te party) or the 
Federal par ty . He sa id , "Today j u s t i c e is being d«:iied to 
Indian Tamils. Some day in the futur'e, when language becomes 
3 
the i s sue , the same would befa l l the Ceylon Tamils". His 
words were prophet ic . And in the f i r s t pa r ty convention in 
1. Gandhi, Gopal, 'Refuge' (Delhi, 1989), p . 67. 
2. Kiishra, P.K., South ^ i a in In te rna t iona l p o l i t i c s , 
(Delhi, 1984) , p . 214. 
3 . Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka t The Fractured Is land, (New Delhi, 
1989) , p . 37. 
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19 51, i t was declared t h a t , "The Tamil speaking people in 
Ceylon cons t i t u t e a nation d i s t i n c t from tha t of the Sinhalese 
by every fundamental t e s t by nationhood". 
I n i t i a l l y the Indian 90vemment led by Jawahar Lai 
Nehru was inc l ined t o cc«isider most of the labourers as Sri 
Lankan na t iona l s . On the other hand/ D.S. Senanayake, the 
prime Minister of Sri Lanka, did not favour granting Sr i 
Lankan c i t i zensh ip t o the e n t i r e labour force of Indian 
or ig in working on the e s t a t e s . The Indian cons t i tu t ion which 
caroe in to force in 1950 al ready l a i d down qua l i f i ca t ions for 
the Indian c i t i z e n s h i p . The divergent approaches of t he two 
goverrwents t o the p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of the persons of the 
Indian o r ig in , u l t imate ly rendered a s i zab le sect ion of the 
Indian Tamils in Sr i Lanka as " s t a t e l e s s " persons. 
Nehru and Senananayake met in London in 19 51 for t a l k s . 
Further in January and October 1954^ t he r e were Nehru-Kbtelwala 
pacts in New Delhi, These were s ign i f i can t attempts by the 
leaders to reso lve t h i s human problem. However/ these ef for t s 
did not r e s u l t in any f r u i t i o n . According t o an est imate made 
in September, 1962, the 1954 Agreement s e t t l e d the s t a tus (as 
1. Kearney, Robert N. , Comjnxjnalisro and LanquB^ q<^  in the 
p o l i t i c s of Cevlon, (Durham, N. CarolIna, 1967) , pp.93-94. 
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Ceylon or Indian Nationals) of two lakhs of peqple of Indian 
or igin while the t o t a l number of these people was near ly ten 
lakh. About 8 lakhs were l e f t as ' s t a t e l e s s * . The bulk oc 
the e s t a t e labour as they were born in Ceylon, qual i f ied for 
t he Ceylon c i t i zensh ip under Ceylon laws. But i t became a 
p r a c t i c e t o turn down every appl ica t ion for Ceylon c i t izenship 
of these emigrant labourers and t h e i r families as the s l i g h t e s t 
evidence of the appl icant having maintained any contact with 
India . AS a resu l t« so many hundred thousands were not Indian 
c i t i z e n s under Indian laws, and if they were not recognised at 
any given moment in time as c i t i z e o s of Ceylon, they were 
s t a t e l e s s persons . 
In 1964, the Indian and the Ceylon governments estimated 
2 
t h a t the re were 975,000 ' s t a t e l e s s * persons in the i s land . 
To resolve t h i s problem, the Prime Ministers of two count r ies , 
Mrs.. Sirimavo Bhandarnaike of Sr i Lanka and Mr, Lai B«hadur 
Shast r i of India signed an Agreement in October 19 64, which is 
commonly known as 'Srimavo-Shastri Agreement* . According to 
t h i s Agreement, i t was decided t h a t Ceylon and India would 
divide t he ' s t a t e l e s s * persons in a 4;7 proposi t ion, i . e . for 
every four persons accepted by Ceylon, India would take seven 
1. Raroaswamy, p . , o p . c i t . , pp. 58-59, 
2, Mohan Ram, o p . c i t . , p . 111. 
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back. In e f fec t , Ceylon was t o give c i t i zensh ip to 30CJ000 
persons, while India was t o accept 525,000 in a period of 
f i f teen years slowly. The s t a t u s of the 150,OoO l e f t out in 
t h e sharing exercise was to be decided l a t e r . Natural 
increase in the s t i p u l a t e d number for r e p a t r i a t i o n to India and 
grant of Ceylon c i t i z ensh ip respec t ive ly , were a l so covered 
by ttie agreement. 
In a way, t h i s agreement would mean t h a t an enormous 
nanber of poor people who had beccme a l i ens in t h e i r own homes 
in India and s e t t l e d in Ceylcn, would be \xproote6 and put to 
great hardship i f forced back in to Ind ia . The p l igh t of these 
people can be understood with the help of these l ines of the 
novel 'Refuge' , "And now, when we (planta t ion labourers) have 
l o s t a l l l i n k with our na t i ve land« when we have sent our 
roots deep into t h i s s o i l l i k e the t ea bushes planted by us, 
we a re t o l d tha t we do not belong here , t h a t we must go back 
to India , t h a t if we s tay on here , we w;Lll teve no r i g h t s , I s 
2 ^• 
t h i s f a i r ? I s t h i s j u s t ? " 
The Indian government has shown sympathy and utmost 
considerat ion in accepting the l i a b i l i t y of the s t a t e l e s s 
1- Ibi^T 
2, Gandhi, Gopal, o p . c i t , , p , 149, 
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persons which i t was not obliged t o consider . The greater 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y in the implementation of t h i s a l l lay with Sri 
Lanka because of the physical presence of the s t a t e l e s s persons 
t h e r e . But the Lankan Government showed ta rd iness in the 
implementation of the terms of the agreement due to p o l i t i c a l 
f a c to r s . 
The Ceylon government's enactment t o implement the 
agreement took effect in 19 68 and following t h i s the two 
governments inv i ted appl ica t ions for c i t i z e n s h i p . While 
700,000 opted for Ceylonese c i t i zensh ip (the agreement provi -
ded for Ceylon accepting only 300,000) , only 400,OoO sought 
Indian c i t i z ensh ip despi te India having committed i t s e l f t o 
taking 52 5,000 back as r e p a t r i a t e s . Ceylon i n s i s t e d on 
following the 4j7 r a t i o and took only 225,000 of the 700,000 
who had opted for Ceylonese c i t i zensh ip while India accepted 
a l l the 400,000, who had opted for i t s c i t i z e n s h i p . So, in 
addi t ion t o the 150,OoO s t a t e l e s s people whose fa te had not 
been decided when the agreement wa9 signed/ the re were a 
fur ther 200,000 for whom the re was no place in e i t h e r country. 
In January 1974, the Sri Lankan prime Minister , 
Sirimavo Bhandaranaike and Indian Prime Minis ter , Smt. Indira 
Gandhi, signed an agreement to decide the f a t e of 150,000 
1. Mohan Ram, op.cjL^., pp. 111-112. 
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perscns (as i t was decided a t the time of 1964 agreement, 
would be looked a f te r in a supplementary agreement) . This 
agreement decided tha t the 150,000 would be divided equally 
between the two coun t r i e s . But these agreements and enactments 
did not solve the problem of the other s t a t e l e s s Tamils/ 
mainly, those who had opted for Ceylcn in 19 64 but had not 
been granted c i t i z e n s h i p . By fur ther agreement the period of 
v a l i d i t y of the agreement was extended t o 1981. 
In January 1986, the Sr i Lankan parliament - as a r e su l t 
of growing pressure from Minister S. Thondaman and his Ceylon 
worker's Congress (CWC) - enacted l e g i s l a t i o n for the benefit 
of the c i t i zensh ip app l i can t s . Also, in 19 86 Sri Lanka and 
India entered in to an accord on the s t a t e l e s s Tamils in the 
Is land. According to an o f f i c i a l announcement, India wil l 
proceed with the process of conferring c i t i zensh ip oa 85,000 
Tamils of Indian or ig in who applied for Indian c i t i zensh ip 
p r i o r t o October 30, 1981. The Sri Lankan government wil l 
sijnultaneously take ac t ion , both l e g i s l a t i v e and executive, to 
grant c i t i zensh ip t o a l l remaining S ta t e l e s s Tamils of Indian 
o r i g i n . According to t he Indian es t imates , t h i s wil l en ta i l 
S r i Lanka conferring c i t i z ensh ip on a t o t a l of 469,000 persons 
1. Kodikara, Shelton U., Foreigp pol icy of Sri Lankat 
A Third Worl^ Perspective (Delhi, 1982) , p . 35. "" 
34 
and tbe na tura l increase . This f igure includes those who have 
already been granted Sri Lankan c i t i z e n s h i p . 
There are according t o Sri Lankan es t imates , 94,000 
s t a t e l e s s persons of Indian or igin who a re lef tover from the 
Indian quota of 600,OOO under the 1964 Agreement. These 
persons had f a i l ed t o apply for Indian c i t i z ensh ip p r io r t o 
October 30, 1981 in the hope of being given S r i Lankan c i t i -
zenship,Thus, t h i s nunber wil l now be added to the Sri Lankan 
quota of 375,000,^ The S r i Lankan government a l so issued a 
statement announcing i t s decision t o confer S r i Lankan c i t i -
zenship on res idual nanbers of s t a t e l e s s Tamils of Indian 
o r i g i n . 
These s teps were opposed by the Buddhist leaders and 
a l so the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) . Though agreement was 
the re , yet the ac tua l implementation again got stuck in various 
committees and sub-committees of the government, and only about 
3 20,000 were in fact granted c i t i z e n s h i p . Apart from a lack 
of enthusiasm a t various levels of government espec ia l ly among 
the predominantly Sinhalese bureaucracy, the re were p r a c t i c a l 
1. Sinh, Rai,"Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations" in 
Dharmdasani, M .D. (ed.) , Sri Lanka i.JSn_,l8land in C r i s i s , (varanas i , 1988), p . 102. 
2. I-bid., 
3 . Tikku, M.K., "Cit izenship for Tamils", in The Hindustan 
Times, 21 October 1988. ' 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s as wel l . Many of the benef ic ia r ies were not in 
possession of enough evidence to press t h e i r claim/ others 
had moved places in the intervening years and were not eas i ly 
t r a c e a b l e , and s t i l l others were not responding due to i l l i -
teracy cind lack of awareness. 
By 1988, India had granted c i t i zensh ip to 422,OoO people 
of Indian or ig in , Sri Lanka, in turn was obliged t o grant 
c i t i z ensh ip to 468,000 people of Indian or igin and a lso other 
remaining s t a t e l e s s persons . However, t i l l November 1988, only 
238,000 people had been granted c i t i z ensh ip by Sri Lanka, 
another 230,000 were l e f t s t a t e l e s s . 
To end t h i s problem Sri Lanka parliament approved a b i l l 
2 
in Novenber 1988 , which conferred c i t i zensh ip on over 268,000 
Tamil p lan ta t ion workers, and a lso the r i g h t s and pr iv i leges 
1. Times of India , 13 October 1988. 
2, Approved by the Sri Lanka Cabinet on 12 October, 1988 and 
by the parliament of S r i Lanka on 9 November, 1988 (Times 
of Ind ia , Nov. 11, 1988) . The relevant port ion of the 
b i l l reads as foilowsj 
"Notwithstanding any other law, every person 
who (a) i s of Indian origin lawfully resident 
in Sr i Lanka; (b) i s ne i the r a c i t i z en of S r i 
Lanka nor of India and (c) has not a t any time 
applied or been included in an appl icat ion t o 
the Indian High Commissic« in Sri LSnka for the 
grant of Indian c i t i zensh ip sha l l have the 
s t a tu s of c i t i z e n of S r i Lanka with effect from 
the date of commencement of t h i s Act and shal l 
be e n t i t l e d t o a l l the r i gh t s and pr iv i leges to 
which the other c i t i z ens of Sr i Lanka are 
e n t i t l e d by law." 
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which the other c i t i z ens of Sri Lanka enjoyed. I t was done 
to get Tamil votes(for p res iden t i a l e lect ion) t h a t Mr. Thondaroan 
and his Ceylon worker's Congress (CWC) con t ro l s . On a rough 
reckoning, i t was assumed tha t Mrs. Sirimavo Bhandarnaike and 
Mr. R. premadasa wi l l s p l i t the Sinhalese votes between them 
almost equal ly , i t would be the minori ty \o te tha t may decide 
the outcome and given the general indifference of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil of the North-east in t h a t s i t u a t i i o n , i t were the 
Indian Tamils who would t i l t the balance. 
Prom the very beginning the problem was complicated. 
There were many hinderance in the Implementation of c i t i zensh ip 
agreements. Now, though t h i s problem is almost solved in 
theory/ p r a c t i c a l l y i t s t i l l remains t h e r e . 
Important among the factors which hindered the implemai'-
t a t i o n programmes have been divergence of pa r ty - p o l i t i c a l 
2 
approach towards these agreemoits in S r i Lanka. There has been 
a basic difference between the two main p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s in 
Sr i Lanka as regards the rec ip roc i ty requirement for grant of 
S r i Lankan c i t i zensh ip and r epa t r i a t i on t o India under the terms 
of t h a t agreement. Divergent i n t e rp re t a t ions r e l a t i n g t o the 
19 64 agreement and delay on Sr i Lanka's p a r t in executing i t 
1. Tikku, M.K., OP .c i t . . The Hindustan Times, 2i October 1988. 
2. Kodicara, Shelton U., o p . c i t . , pp . 35-37. 
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were among the main p o l i t i c a l problems which slowed down the 
implementation of 1964 agreement. 
SLFP governments under Mrs. Bhandarnaike s t r i c t l y 
adhered to the l e t t e r of the agreement s t i p u l a t i n g grant of 
Sr i Lanka c i t i z ensh ip t o 4 persons for every 7 persons ac tua l ly 
r e p a t r i a t e d to India . However/ when the government of Dudley 
Senanayake of UMP (1965-70) be la tedly enacted the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement Implementation Act in-mid 1967, t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n was 
changed such tha t i t became su f f i c i en t to grant S r i Lankan c i t i -
zenship to 4 persons for every 7 persons r eg i s t e red as Indian 
c i t i z e n s , though staying temporarily in S r i Lanka un t i l the date 
of t h e i r r e p a t r i a t i o n on residence permit . When in 1970* 
Mrs. Bhandarnaike came back to power, an amendment t o Implemen-
t a t i o n Act was passed making employment of a temporary residence 
permit overstay, an offence. The UNP government of J.R. Jayewa; 
dene, once again res tored , by amendment of the Act, r ac iproc i ty 
the grant of S r i Lanka and Indian c i t i z ensh ip respec t ive ly , 
r e t a in ing the 4:7 r a t i o . Residence permit overstays became a 
nagging problem for successive Sr i Lankan governments. Some of 
the overstays were no doubt caused by delays in payment of 
Employees provident Fund (EPP) benefi ts and g r a t u i t y by the Sr i 
Lankan a u t h o r i t i e s . At the same time, S r i Lanka o f f i c i a l s have 
averred t h a t often r e p a t r i a t e s are not t o be found in the 
addressffy given by them, and t h a t large sums of EPF are lying 
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unu t i l i zed . 
Another outstanding problem was t h a t a f t e r receiving 
app l i ca t i ons , i t was found t h a t approximately 625,000 s t a t e l e s s 
persons of Indian origin had applied for Ceylon c i t i zensh ip / 
while only 400/000 persons bad applied for r ^ a t r i a t i c n to 
Ind ia . "^  In other words, India had a sho r t f a l l of 126,000 t o 
f u l f i l l i t s t a r g e t s vnder 1964 agreement, while the applicants 
for Sr i Lankan c i t i zensh ip were more than twice the number 
envisaged uider the agreement. So, the c i t i zensh ip was the 
biggest problem for the Indian migrants in Sri Lanka, The 
denial of c i t i zensh ip for them was d i rec t a t t ack on t h e i r 
f ee l ings . The core , the very p i t h of the matter i s fee l ing . 
Feelings of belonging, of a s soc ia t ion , of sentiments. 
* * f t « 
1. Ib id . 
2. Kodicare, Shelton U., OD,ci t . , p . 36, 
3. Gandhi, Gopal, Re^ug^ (Delhi, 1989), p . 175. 
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Chapter - 3 
THE ETHNIC PROBLEMS 
Various e t tmic problems have made S r i Lanka, a b a t t l e -
grovnd. The c i t i z e n s h i p problem was p u r e l y a p o l i t i c a l problem 
and a f f e c t e d on ly t h e Indian Tamils i n S r i Lanka. But l a t e r 
on , t h e e t h n i c problems l i k e , l anguage , e d u c a t i o n , employment, 
r e g i o n a l autonomy, c o l o n i s a t i o n of Tamil a r e a s by S inha lese 
and r e l i g i o - c u l t u r a l problems came up, which a f f e c t e d Tamil-
speaking community as a whole, i nc lud ing both t h e S r i Lankan 
Tamils and Ind ian Tamils in S r i Lanka, The r i g i d s t a n d taken 
by t h e S inha lese -domina ted governments in t h e name of e thnocen-
t r i c i t y has made t h e s i t u a t i o n grave and mi se r ab l e for t h e 
Tamil community. Important of t h e s e problems a r e d i scussed here 
in d e t a i l . 
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A. Pro-blem of Language; 
In Sr i Lanka, each ethnic grovjp has i t s own language. 
The Sinhalese speak Sinhaia language brought t o the is land by 
migrants frxxn North India about 25CD years ago. The Tamil i s 
the mother tongue of the Tamils. The Moors speak Tamil. 
Those who are s e t t l e d in the Sinhalese areas speak English 
as well as t h e i r mother tongues, 
A more spec i f i c but l e ss complex i ssue concerns the 
language r i g h t s of the Tamils. I t can be sa id t h a t d i s c r i -
minaticwi in ensuring the l i n g u i s t i c r i g h t s of minor i t i e s / 
which include p r i n c i p a l l y the r igh t to education/ manage 
publ ic a f f a i r s and coromunicaticn in t h e i r own language/ is 
one of the e s sen t i a l r e q u i s i t e s for the procnoticn of nat ional 
in tegra t ion and r a c i a l un i ty . In any p lu ra l socie ty / the 
minor i t i e s are more s e n s i t i v e towards t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c r igh t s 
as they feel t h a t the preservat ion of t h e i r e thnic iden t i ty 
and cu l tu ra l and eccnomic development are based on the guaran-
t e e of t h e i r language r i g h t s . 
The language i ssue sprang from the th rus t of the 
n a t i o n a l i s t movement i t s e l f . Agitation for the use of Swabhasha 
1. Sahadevan, p . , and Nayak/ S.C., "Ethnic Competition and 
Nation Building in Sr i Lanka", in Dharmdasani/ M.D. (ed.) / 
S r i Lanka ; An Is land in Cr i s i s (varanasi , 1988), p . 51. 
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(by which was meant Sinhala and Tamil) as s t a t e languages 
began in the 1920s. I t seemed logical t h a t with independoice 
the language of the colonial roaster should be replaced in 
government, adminis t ra t ion and education by the language of 
loca l people. At independence, a l l p o l i t i c a l gro»;ps were 
cormitted to gradually making Sinhala and Tamil the o f f i c i a l 
languages of the country in p lace of English. The demand for 
naticanal languages was reasonable as only 6% of the population 
were English-educated and the remaining 9454 were more or l ess 
a l i ena ted from the a<ininistration of the westernised "power 
e l i t e " in the p o l i t i c a l , economic and cu l tu ra l spheres. 
In the beginning ag i t a t i on was for the use of Swabhasha, 
which included both Sinhalese and Tamil. But the assaul t on 
the language r i gh t s of the Tamil minority was t o begin soon. 
Some p o l i t i c i a n s took the opportunity t o ferment the s i t u a t i o n . 
S.W.R.D. Bhandarnaike qui t the Uhited National party (UNP) , 
s t i l l led by Anglicised e l i t e , t o form the s r i Lanka Freedom 
par ty (SLFp) in 19 5i . I t s o r i en ta t ion was Sinhala-Buddhist 
nat ional ism. Radical r h e t o r i c and Sinhala Clfiuvinism were 
involved by i t to win the s ippor t of the sect ions of the po l i t y 
which had no l inks with the plantatic«> economy tha t had 
1. Jacob, Lucy, M., Sri Lanka ; From Dominion t o Republic,. 
(New Delhi, 1973) , p . 155. 
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produced the Anglicised e l i t e . 
The SLFP was too new t o be able to make language the 
issue at the 19 52 e l e c t i o n s . This issue got more corrplicated 
when Prime Minister John Kotelawala sparked a controversy by 
premising pa r i t y of Sinhala with Tamil when English was phased 
out . The English versus swabhasha deraandr which r e l a t e d t o 
the replacement of a foreign language was more or less accep-
t a b l e . But the p a r i t y of Sinhala and Tamil concerned the 
r e l a t i v e s t a t u s of two indigenous languages. In sum, the Tamil-
Sinhala p a r i t y i ssue was subs t an t i a l l y more s e n s i t i v e . At i t s 
inception, the SLFP had ca l l ed for the p a r i t y of Sinhala and 
Tamil, But by the end of 19 55, i t was advocating the primacy 
of Sinhala, as the sole o f f i c i a l language in the place of 
English, and shor t ly afterwards entered in to a coa l i t i on with 
a few smaller p a r t i e s to form the Ma ha lana Eksath peram una 
(M.E.P.) . But the UNP was s t i l l for p a r i t y . So were the main 
l e f t p a r t i e s , the Lanka Sama Samaj Pairty (LSSp) and the 
Communist Party of Ceylon. 
The issue began hot t ing vp as the four years term of 
the parliament e lec ted in 1952 was ending. The Tamil congress 
which had s e t t l e d for responsible co-operation with the ru l ing 
1, Mohan Ram, Sr i Lanka ; The Fractured Is lapd (New Delhi,1989), 
p . 38. 
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[JtiP fouid i t necessary t o end the a l l i a n c e because there was 
growing Tamil anxiety over t he language i s sue . All the Tamil 
Congress minis te rs and Parliament members resigned because the 
UNP conference would not discuss i ssue concerning the Tamil 
minori ty or the language i s sue in p a r t i c u l a r . The Tamil 
Congress leaders annouQced a united front t o defend the Tamil 
language and cu l tu re and t o carry on the s t ruggle for a Tamil 
s t a t e which would offer to federate with t he Sliihala s t a t e on 
terms of ccmplete equa l i ty . 
The year 19 56 was a landnark in t h e h i s to ry of Sr i 
Lanka's p o l i t i c a l development as well ap e thnic c o n f l i c t . In 
the 19 56 e lec t ions a united frcnt headed by the SLFP led by 
S.W.R.D. Bhandamaike rode the bandwagon of Sinhala Buddhist 
resurgence and defeated the ru l ing IJNP. Thereafter/ Buddhism 
and the Sinhalese language began t o rece ive government p a t r o -
nage to the detriment of the Tamils. 
That year, the Buddhist committee of Enquiry published 
i t s report which was a c lea r indictment of the rul ing UNP for 
i t s neglect of Buddhist i n t e r e s t s . I t s recommendations were 
extremely cammvxial. Besides demanding the creat ion of a Buddha 
Sasana (adninis t ra t ion) i t asked for the repeal of the Section 
1. Mohan Ram* o p . c i t . . pp, 38-39 
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in the cons t i t u t i on dealing with p ro t ec t i ve clauses per ta ining 
t o the m i n o r i t i e s . The repor t which was ca l l ed "Betrayal of 
Buddhism" was a s ign i f i can t docunent of Buddhist resurgence 
and became an ef fec t ive p o l i t i c a l instrument in the hands of 
the Buddhist chauv in i s t s . Among the e a r l i e s t measures of the 
new government headed by Mr. Bhandaranaike* was t he "Sinhala 
only" Bil l in 19 56. This Bil l was adopted in the House of 
Representat ives on 15 June 19 56 by 66 votes (peoples united 
Front, UNP and Independents) t o 2 (Lanka Sama Samaj, Federa l is ts 
and Communists) . The Senate passed the Bi l l on 6 July by 
1 
19 t o 6. Later on, i t was incorporated in the cons t i tu t ion 
of 19 72. I t declared that the Sinhala language shal l be the 
o f f i c i a l language of Sri Lanka. Breaking the monopoly of higher 
education exercised by the English-educated c l a s se s , the two 
Buddhist u n i v e r s i t i e s , Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara Pir ivenas, 
were s t a r t e d in 19 59 opening the doors of the University educa-
2 
t ion t o t h e Sinhalese-educated s tuden t s . 
The Tamils perceived t h i s s tep as a breach of t r u s t on 
the p a r t of the leadership of dominant p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s because 
e a r l i e r , both the UNP and the SLPp had supported the subs t i t u -
t ion of English by Sinhala and Tamil, This was a severe blow 
1. Saran, p . . Government and p o l i t i c s of Sri Lanka (New 
Delhi, 1982) , p . 11 . 
2. Jacob, Lucy M., o p , c i t . , p . 156. 
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to Tamil i n t e r e s t s / and caused much resentment among them. 
Thv£/ vvith the induction of mass p o l i t i c s and the demise 
of English as the o f f i c i a l language, the phase of Sinhalese-
Tamil ccmpetit ive co-exis tence moved in to a phase of ethnic 
c o n f l i c t . 
In ea r ly 19 57, tension and violence increased. The 
Federal par ty , headed by Chelavanayakam, decided t o launch 
a c i v i l disobedience movement t o press fo r p a r i t y . After nego-
t i a t i o n s with prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bhandamaike, the 
Bhandarnaike-Chelavanayakaro Pact was signed on 20 July 19 57. 
In i t , Tamil was recognised as the 'language of a nat ional 
m i n o r i t y ' , i t would be a 'Language of adminis t ra t ion ' in the 
northern and eas tern provinces without prejudice to Sinhala as 
the o f f i c i a l language. Pro-Sinhalese organizat ions pro tes ted 
against the pact and i t was promptly abrogated by Bhandaroaike, 
in 19 58. 
With t h i s , the mutual suspicion between the two commu-
n i t i e s assuned a sharper edge. The Federal party issued a 
statement on lO ^ r i l 19 58 c a l l i n g x^ jon a l l Tamil-speaking people 
t o embark on a non-violent c i v i l disobedience movement in order 
t o receive an honourable place in the community for themselves 
and t h e i r language. 
1. Saran, p . , o p . c i t y , p . 11 . 
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in 19 65, Chelavanayakaro entered in to a new pact , t h i s 
time with Dudley Senanayake. But t h i s pact a l so fomd i t s way 
in to the dustbin of h i s to ry . The f i r s t Republican cons t i t u -
t ion of Sri Lanka of 19 72 a l so did not contain adequate p ro -
vis ions for safeguarding the i n t e r e s t s and language of the 
Tamil minor i ty . Consequently, the Tamil canmunity, which had 
a l l along stood for regicxial autonomy under a federal c o n s t i -
t u t i o n , began to demand the establishments 6f a separate Tamil 
s t a t e . 
As the s i t u a t i o n was de ter iora t ing day by day, the 
second Republican cons t i t u t ion of Sr i Lanka of 19 78 t r i e d t o 
improve the s t a tu s of Tamil language as i t declared Tamil a 
ne t iona l language alongwith the Sinhala a f t e r re ta in ing l a t t e r 
as t he only o f f i c i a l language of the country. But again, when 
discr iminatory standards based on language were applied to the 
Tamil s tudents seeking entry to iz i ivers i t ies^ during Sirimayo 
Bhandarnaike's regime, the Tamil youth was enraged, giving b i r t h 
t o s e p a r a t i s t tendencies. 
Dr. Colvin R. De Si lva , academic theo re t i c i an and legal 
expert of LSSp (Lanka Sama Samaj party) ,had warned parliament 
in 19 56 when the 'Sinhala Only' Bi l l was debated by saying, 
1. The Times of India , 22 December 1975. 
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"Tvo torn l i t t l e bleeding nat ions may yet a r i s e ovt^fone l i t t l e 
s t a t e . " ^ pa r i ty for Sinhala and Tamil might have held t h e . 
nat ion together and the Bhandaranaike-Chelavanayakam Pact might 
yet have saved the i s land from a d i s a s t e r . This was r ea l i s ed by 
Sinhalese leaders a f t e r 30 years t h a t decisicn on an o f f i c i a l 
2 
language was a major mistake. 
In 1987, president Jayewardene has wisely accepted that 
giving Tamil a second r a t e s t a tu s way back in 19 56/ was a 
r e t r o g r a t e s tep and has cont r ibuted in a l a rge measure to the 
a l i ena t i on of the Tamils from the c o u i t r y ' s mainstream. I t was 
the kind of a mistake Pakistan committed in East Pakistan when 
i t imposed Urdu on Bengalis. In an interview a day a f t e r signing 
the Inc3o-Sri Lanka Accord of 29 Ju ly 1987, he said t h a t i t was 
his and his p a r t y ' s mistake t o have backed the Sinhala Only 
demand. 
B . Probj.em of ^;Laher Eeducation and Employpnept? 
Education has become one of t he most controvers ia l issues 
in e thnic r e l a t i o n s in S r i Lanka and has c l e a r l y been one of 
1. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka t The Fractured I s land , (New Delhi, 
1989) , p . 4 1 . 
2. Ib id . 
3 . An Interview of President Jayewardene with N. Ram in Thg 
Hindu, 31 Ju ly 1987. 
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the major causes underlying the i n t ens i f i ca t i on of ethnic 
c o n f l i c t . The Tamils were sys temat ica l ly discriminated by the 
Goverrments a t Colombo s ince 1970. 
The Tamil-dominated northern and eastern provinces in 
S r i Lanka have always been poor in resources , affording l i t t l e 
scope for economic development. The Tamils of the region have, 
the re fore , looked t o education as the means of eccnomic advan-
cement. Entry into the professions was a means of soc ia l mobi-
l i t y and the B r i t i s h , who were masters in the a r t of dividing 
a people among themselves, encouraged then because of t h e i r 
po l icy of playing them off against the S^Jihala majori ty. 
Chr i s t i an Missionary Schools brought education t o the Tamil 
a r ea s . The Buddhist p r i e s t s , who were t r a d i t i o n a l educators and 
communicators in pre-colcmial days, were against Christian 
educational a c t i v i t y in the Sinhala a r ea s . So the Buddhist 
voice arose from the anxiety t h a t ' ' the Christ ian i n s t i t u t i o n s 
1 
were being u t i l i z e d as vechicles for conversion". 
The d i l i gen t Tamils were very mobile. Jaffna exported 
manpower for whi te -co l la r jobs and the professions in the r e s t 
of the i s land and beyond t o other Br i t i sh colonies . At the time 
of independence, the Jaffna peninsula had an educational 
1. Saran, P . , o p . c i t . , p . 9 . 
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i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , whereas the r e s t of the is land lacked i t , 
with exception of the Colombo region. And the promotion of 
free education, a f t e r independence, helped a phenomenal 
expansion of primary and secondary school enrolment among 
the Tf^iils. However, the growing prejudice to the Sinhalas, 
added to the pressure of competition at the higher l e v e l . 
The Tamils looked to higher and more special ized profess io-
nal education (engineering, medicine and Science) to stay 
ahead in the competit ion, because the number of white-col lared 
jobs were decl ining for them. With Sinhala as the sole 
o f f i c i a l language since 1956 those who did not know i t , 
were at a disadvantage. Despite an expansion of the adminis-
t r a t i v e jobs in the Sinhala areas were los t to them. A similar 
expansion of services in the Tamil areas did not help much 
because the proportion of Tamil school-leavers were, more than 
could be absorbed t h e r e . So the Tamils t r i ^d t o meet the 
new s i t ua t i on by turning out a d ispropor t ionate ly large 
number of Science graduates aspir ing t o enter the special ized 
profess ions . This attempt to solve the problem only 
brought new problems ins tead . For ins tance , unemployed 
Science graduates s t a r t ed teaching in schools, and there was 
a majority of Tamil school- leavers in Science. 
1. Mohan Ram, op . c i t ^ ^ p , J+6. 
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The main t a s k before the S r i Lankan government in 
the beginning of 19703 was t o r e s t ruc tu re the educational 
system for imparting s c i e n t i f i c education at the school l e v e l / 
No doubt, the Sri Lankan Tamils maintained t h e i r r a t i o in 
Science education before I965 with the help of t h e i r 
missionary-schooling. But they have los t t h e i r preponderant 
pos i t ion following the expansion of secondary education in 
the Sinhalese areas by neglect ing the Tamil dominated 
provinces and t r a n s i t i o n to vernacular teaching from English. 
With a c lea r move to r e s t r i c t considerably pupils coming 
from Tamil minority schools with superior laboratory f a c i l i -
t i e s , the government systematical ly ignored the timely needs 
of the Tamil schools . For example, in 1972 most of the Tamil 
and Muslim schools were, functioning without English and 
Science t eache r s , even though more than 2000 candidates 
2 
enro l led t h e i r names during 1970-72. 
The Ministry of Education followed the r a t i o of 
80 (Sinhalese) : 12 (Tamils) :8 (Muslims) for the recruitment 
of teachers in 1976. The r a t i o prescr ibed for recruitment 
of teachers gave overpercentage to the Sinhalese as 
according to the population of each ethnic group, the r a t i o 
1. oahdevan, P./Nayak, S.C., "Ethnic Competition and Nation 
Building in S r i Lanka" i n Dharmdasanl, M.D. (ed.) 
QP.cit . f p . 53. 
2- Sr i Lanka. National State Assembly Debates. Vol h-(h) 
No. 8, 28 December I972, Col. 2116. ' 
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should have been fixed a t 72J2ls7. I t not only created a 
b a r r i e r t o develop a standard in education, but a l so became 
an instrument to cause iinbalance between cornrnxinities in the 
realm of education. On the other s i d e , the question of admis-
s ions to un ive r s i t i e s a lso gave r i s e t o a ser ious c r i s i s . Upto 
1969, admissions were based on the f ina l examination a t the 
sen ior secondary school l e v e l . Despite a l l the discrimination/ 
those who s tudied in the Tamil lenguage formed the major 
propor t ion of those who were admitted to desired d i s c i -
p l ines . 
In 19 70, the SLFP dominated United Front Government* 
having reviewed the except ional ly good performance of Tamil 
s tudents in the Science d i s c i p l i n e s , p o l i t i c i s e d the higher 
educat ion. Mrs* Bhandarneike government succuntsed to the 
Sinhalese pressure to abandon the univers i ty admissions based 
on meri t , which placed the Tamils in an advantageous pos i t ion , 
as i t had devised new admission po l i c i e s every year with 
the motive of increasing the percentage of the Sinhalese 
t o higher education. For example, a formula with different 
I b i d . , Vol. 21(1), Ko. 8, 3 December 1976, Col. 1687. 
3^ 
grading marks was used in 1971-72 to admit students in 
U n i v e r s i t i e s . Subsequently, s tandardiza t ion-cum-dis t r ic t 
q iota system, and mer i t -cum-dis t r ic t quota scheme were used 
in 1973, 197^ and 1976 respec t ive ly . 
This new system of se lec t ion ca l l ed ' s t andard iza t ion ' 
was introduced in I97I , when United Front Government took 
up the posi t ion that i t was d i f f i c u l t t o compare the r e l a t ive 
standards of Sinhalese medium and Tamil-medium s tudents . 
I t was decided to set cut-off points to regulate the quota 
of the admissions from each ethnic group. In effect i t weighed 
the marks of the Tamil applicants downwards which meant 
tha t they had to score more marks than t h e i r Sinhalese coun-
t e r p a r t t o ccxnpete with them for access t o higher education. 
In 1969, the Tamils secured 50% of the admissions to the 
medical faculty and ^8.3:^ to engineer ing. After the 1971 
s tandardiza t ion formula, t h e i r share dropped t o 28% and 19^ 
respec t ive ly in 1977. The formula was scrapped in 1978 but 
was reintroduced in a modified form t o placate Sinhala opinion 
and the discr iminat ion against the Tamils continued. 
I t may be argued t h a t the primary concern of every 
democratic government i s to e s t a b l i s h balance between different 
1. Sahdevan, P./Nayak,S.C,, "Ethnic Competition and Nation 
Building in Sr i Lanka" in Dharmdasani, M,D, ( e d . ) , 
Sr± Lanka; An Island in Cr i s i s (Varanasi^ I988), pp,5V-^5. 
2 . Mohan Ram, Sr i Lankat The Fractured Island (New Delhi, 1Q89) 
p . "+7. 
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communities in a t t a in ing educat ion, employment and the 
economic development. I t i s the r e spons ib i l i t y of the 
government t o see t h a t the underprivileged are brought upto 
na t iona l mainstream with the help of specia l provis ions . 
At the same t ime, when i t gives p r i o r i t y t o any under 
pr iv i leged sec t ion , i t should not be on the ethnic conside-
ra t ion but on the bas i s of backwardness. But the Sr i Lankan 
experience reveals tha t the governments'were more p a r t i c u l a r 
to improve the Sinhalese under pr iv i leged sect ion than the 
non-Sinhalese in backward a reas . Because among the non-
Sinhalese , the Indian/Tamils were the most backward community 
in education whose representa t ion t o the higher education was 
at times zero and the i l l i t e r a c y ra te in 1978 was ^3 J 
I t obviously led to considerable f rus t ra t ion and disappoint-
ment among Tamil youths . 
Employment; 
At the time of independence, a number of important 
pos i t ions in the public services and the armed forces were held 
by the Chris t ians and Ceylon Tamils, This fact led the 
Sinhalese to th ink tha t they were denied the employment that 
was due to them in proportion to t h e i r populat ion. Therefore, 
1. Central Bank of Ceylon^ Report on Consumer and Soctio-
Bconcmic Survey 1978-79^ Table 1^^ p . 28. 
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p a r a l l e l to the demand for b e t t e r educational f a c i l i t i e s , 
the demand for more employment also came up from the 
Sinhalese . Hence, the demand was met when Mrs. Bhandarnaite 's 
SLFP Government na t iona l i sed majority of schools in 1960. 
Object ively, the grant of o f f i c i a l s t a tus to Sinhala 
provided the Sinhala educated middle c lass prospects for 
b e t t e r opportuni t ies for employment and promotion in public . 
s e r v i c e s . In a scarce resource soc ie ty , with the s t a t e being 
the l a rges t employer, the language issue was thus not merely 
an emotive issue but was infused with hard economic implica-
t i o n s . The Tamils had dominated the c i v i l service and the 
professions in the past but t h e i r share began dec l in ing . In 
I98O, Sinhalese who were about 70i^  of the population held Q5% 
of a l l the Jobs in the s t a t e sec to r , 82/S in the professional 
and technica l ca t egor i e s , and 83^ in the administrative and 
managerial se rv ices . The Tamils had only 11^ of the public 
sector jobs , 13^ of the profess ional and techn ica l pos t s , 
and 1^^ of the administrat ive and managerial pos i t i ons . The 
Tamils cons t i tu ted 5^ of the c i v i l service in 1970. In 1977 
2 
no Tamil gained entry to i t . 
1. Wriggins, W. Howard, Ceylon ; Dilemma of A New Nation 
(New Jersey , I96O), p . I 9 . 
2 . Mohan Ram, o p . c i t . , p . ^ 7 . 
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In the context of recruitment to the Sri Lankan public 
s e rv i ce s , there are three major forms of patronage system. 
These can be v i sua l i sed as based on comraunalism par t i san 
a t t i t u d e and nepotism. Communal patronage, unlike in other 
Third world coun t r i e s , is not on the considerat ion of socio-
economic backwardness of a p a r t i c u l a r community but in terms 
of e t h n i c i t y . The favouratism and nepotism were institutiona.-.: 
l i zed following p o l i t i c a l competition between the SLFP and the 
UNP. They followed the policy of awarding public post to 
t h e i r partymen purely to reciprocate the g i f t of votes at the 
e l e c t i o n . Since the governmental power i s shared per iodica l ly 
by the tvo Sinhalese p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , (SLFP and the UNP), the 
Sri Lankan patronage system has assumed a more exclusive and 
discriminatory form. 
T i l l the s tandars iza t ion was introduced in higher 
education the Tamils had a high percentage in t echn ica l 
employment due t o t h e i r large number in Science courses . But 
they have los t t h e i r proportion since 1970. Fur ther , because 
of the language and other b a r r i e r s to employment in the public 
s ec to r , quite a lo t of Tamils were findijtg self-employment 
or s e t t i n g up t h e i r own e n t e r p r i s e s . All t h i s consis tent 
in jus t i ce gave an impetus t o the Tamil mi l i t an t movement in 
northern and eas tern par t of Sr i Lanka, 
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C. Colonisation of Tamil Areas; 
The reset t lement of the Sinhalese from the densely 
populated south-west t o the sparcely populated Northern and 
Eastern provinces which the Tamils regard as t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l 
homelands also has caused ethnic tension between the two 
co'^raunities since 1960s. All governments since independence 
have made e f fo r t s to reduce Sri Lanka's dependence on r ice 
imports. One means of doing t h i s was t o construct i r r iga t ion 
schemes or to res tore ancient ones in order to encourage popu-
l a t i on in the densely populated Sinhalese areas to migrate to 
the nor th -cen t ra l and eas te rn regions of the country, which 
had remained sparcely populated for c en tu r i e s . The problem 
has been amplified by the Mahaveli development p ro jec t . Most 
of the i r r i ga t ed farmland created by the Mahaveli project has 
1 been d i s t r i bu t ed t o Sinhalese s e t t l e r s . Most of the s e t t l e r s 
being Sinhalese, the Tamils feared tha t such colonisa t ion 
schemes would be used by Sinhalese - dominated governments to 
coT»v«rt Tamil majority areas in Sinhalese majority a reas . This 
led to tensions in these a reas . 
1. Baxter. Graig and o the r s , Government and P o l i t i c s in 
South Asia (Lahore ^ 1988)^ pp. 3 -^7-314-8. 
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The change in the ethnic composition due t o coloni-
sat ion schemes gave r i s e to suspicion and fear among the 
Tamils, who viewed i t as an endeavour to"makB the Tamils a 
slave r a c e . " The Tamil leaders made i t c l ea r tha t they were 
against enly the Government's attempt in converting the 
Tamils in to a minority group in northern and eas te rn pro-
vinces by s e t t l i n g the Sinhalese, not against the l a t t e r buying 
lands in Tamil a reas . They even sought Jus t i f i ab l e places to 
be a l l o t t e d to the landless loca l Tamils while se lec t ing 
colonies in the Tamil provinces. But, turning down the Tamil's 
p l ea , the Government j u s t i f i e d the Sinhalese migration from 
west zone to North and East as t h e i r fundamental r i gh t s 
granted in the c o n s t i t u t i o n . But, the government's fa i lure in 
preserving the i n t e r e s t of the c i t i z e n s and maintaining 
equa l i ty amoVthem in every sphere, shows the inherent e s t a -
b l i shed idea to secure p o l i t i c a l ga in . 
In l a t e r 1970s, de t e r io ra t ion of t r a n q u i l i t y in Sri 
Lanka forced the Government of Sri Lanka t o come to an 
understanding with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
on the settlement i s sue . The expected r e su l t of endeavour was 
an arrangement of colonies in such a way that the demographic 
1. Sahdevan P. and Nayak, S.C., "Ethnic Competition and 
Nation Building in Sr i Lanka", in Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) 
S r i Lanka ; An Is land in Cr i s i s^ p . 59, 
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composition of the t e r r i t o r i e s wil] not be d is turbed . But 
the whole p ic ture was changed a f te r the h i s t o r i c violence of 
July 1933. To make things worse, the government had f inal ised 
a plan in 1985 to s e t t l e 30,000 Sinhalese families in the Tamil 
North with the ul t imate aim of c rea t ing pa r i t y in the population 
of communities t h e r e . The proposal sa id , "the prospective 
s e t t l e r s would be 75% e thnic Sinhalese in l ine with the overal l 
population breakdown of the country". Atulathumudali, the 
National Security Min i s te r , announcing the proposed plan, 
s t a ted tha t "the only way to root out terror ism was to remove 
the concept of ' t r a d i t i o n a l homeland* and create pa r i t y between 
d i f fe ren t c-cmununities, He added t h a t the new s e t t l e r s would be 
given mi l i t a ry t r a i n i n g and equipped with arms t o safeguard 
2 
themselves". The Tamils, on the other hand, made the Government 
c l e a r tha t i f the colonisa t ion scheme goes through, there can be 
no so lu t ion than the d iv is ion of the country. 
Others; 
There are other issues which created pro\»lems. The 
problem of decen t ra l i sa t ion of power is very s i gn i f i c an t . One 
1 I b i d . , p . 60, 
2 . Ib id . 
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of the foremost demands of the Tamils from the beginning 
was to e s t ab l i sh a federal system in Sr i Lanka. To t h i s 
e f f e c t , the Federal Party ca l led a Convention at Trincomalee 
in 1956 which demanded establishment of one or more Tamil 
l i n g u i s t i c s t a t e s as a federating uni t or un i t s enjoying 
the ardent autonomy.^ Responding to Federal P a r t y ' s demand, 
in 1957 the then Prime Minis te r , SWRD ^handarnaite signed 
an agreement with Chelavanayakam (ca l led BrC. Pact) which 
provided for the es tab l i shan t of Regional Councils in Sri 
Lanka. But soon i t was abrogated due to mounting Sinhalese 
pressure on the government. As a r e s u l t , the Tamils were 
reverted to resume t h e i r cry for federalism which gathered i t s 
momentum in 1970s. 
For the Tamilt, the uni tary form of government i s the 
rule by the majority community and the minor i t ies are subjected 
to them. They feel tha t d i r ec t pa r t i c i pa t i on of the minori t ies 
2 
could only be possible in the federal system. In this 
context, it was viewed that, "unless the electorate directly 
participate in the administration, it can not be said that 
there is freedom in the country". -* In contrast to it, the 
1. Suntharlingam, C , Ceylon ; Beginning of Freedom 
Struggle.(Colomboy 1967), p. 31. 
2. Sahdevan, P. and Nayak, S.C., op.cit.y p, 63. 
3. Ceylon Constituent Asssmblv Debates. Vol. I, No. 12. 
16 March 1971, Col. ^4-32. 
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Sinhalese perceived i t as an attempt t o d i s in tegra te the 
country in the future . Dismissing the Sinhalese speculat ion, 
the 18.1)11 Parl iamentarians reaffirmed t h e i r dedicat ion in 
preserving the unity and i n t e g r i t y of the country as they sa id , 
I I 
we ar e not asking for the d iv is ion of Sri Lanka on r ac ia l 
b a s i s . We stand for a d iv i s ion of power and thereby achieving 
unity in d i v e r s i t y " . At the same t ime, the Tamils warned the 
Sinhalese of grave consequences i f t h e i r share was denied to 
them. In t h i s regard a Member of Parliament said "whatever 
the federal p r inc ip le was recognised a l l people gained a l o t . 
Wherever I t was denied the loss was not only t o the minori ty, 
2 
but to the majority too" . 
In the response to the Tamil federal demand, the 
United Front Government headed by Mrs. Bhandamaike introduced 
a ' P o l i t i c a l Authority ' system as a measure of administrative 
decen t r a l i s a t ion in 1973. According t o the scheme each 
d i s t r i c t was placed under a p o l i t i c a l authori ty who was a 
ru l ing p a r t y ' s loca l M.P. The Central fund to each d i s t r i c t 
under the decen t ra l i sa t ion budget was placed under the control 
of the D i s t r i c t Planning Authority (DPA), 
Decen t ra l i sa t ion of power under the DPA system was only 
a name sake, p r a c t i c a l l y i t had increased the role of the Central 
1. Ibid.y c o l s . If0l-lf02. 
2 . I b i d . , co l . h03. 
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adminis trat ion at the d i s t r i c t l e v e l . An outcome was tha t 
the Tamil yotith's demand soon became secession and not just 
devolution of power or federal autonomy any more, c r y s t a l l i z i n g 
in to the demand for a sovereign homeland in 1976. 
At t h i s t ime, the UNP government headed by J .R. 
Jayewardene op t imi s t i ca l ly devised a new scheme for decen t ra l i -
zat ion in 1978. I t was a D i s t r i c t Minis ter (M) scheme and 
D i s t r i c t Development Council. All the DMs belonged to the 
rul ing UNP. At the apex, the President of Sri Lanka was the 
Supreme authori ty from whom they derived t h e i r powers. The 
Tamils never extended t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n , - Following the 
debacle of t h i s scheme, he devised D i s t r i c t Development 
Councils (DDC) as a loca l government s t ruc ture in I98O. In 
t h i s scheme a l so , there was s t r i c t c o n t r o l , and could not 
sa t i s fy the Tamils, In 1987, under Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement 
North and Eastern Provinces were merged and e lec t ions were 
held . So, the issue of decen t ra l i za t ion of power has become 
a complicated problem froni the very beginning. 
The inequal f inancia l d i s t r i b u t i o n t o the Tamil 
d i s t r i c t was also considered to increase the complexity since 
1. Sahdevan, P . , o p . c i t . , p . 65. 
63 
1970. While re leas ing funds to d i s t r i c t s under the decentra-
l i s ed budget, i t was the general pol icy of the government to 
talce in to account such c r i t e r i a as population of the d i s t r i c t s , 
ra te of development of the area , the p o t e n t i a l for development 
and the unemployment r a t e . But such c r i t e r i a were not followed 
in the case of the Tamil d i s t r i c t s . Thus, the Tamils were 
denied of t h e i r due share vrhile the Sinhalese d i s t r i c t having 
same c r i t e r i a of the Tamil d i s t r i c t s for a l loca t ion , were given 
more than the l a t t e r . This had aggrevated the problem. 
Geologically, S r i Lanka was an extension of the Indian 
mainland. I t s r e l i g i o n , i t s soc ia l s t r uc tu r e , i t s p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , the language, i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l economy, a l l came 
from India . I t s connections with India were never repudiated, 
yet the Sinhalese were something other than the Indian, and 
t h i s otherness was often ca tegor ica l ly asserted as being the 
I n t r i n s i c qual i ty of Sinhalese c u l t u r e . The modernity of 
nationalism l i e s in the b e l i e f that cul ture and p o l i t i c s should 
be agreeing tha t each cul ture must have i t s own p o l i t i c a l 
2 
roof and t e r r i t o r i a l homeland. Therefore, t h e i r past continued 
to have a sense of exclusive i d e n t i t y . The 1972 cons t i tu t ion 
1. Ramaswainy, P . , New Delhi and S r i Lanka ; Four Decades of 
P o l i t i c s and DiplomacY, (New D e l h i , iQfl?^, p . on 
2 . Singh, S .B. ,"Tamil Minor i ty in S r i Lanka" in Dharmd«Lsani, 
M.D. ( e d . ) , o p . c i t . , p . 153. 
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accorded spec ia l p r iv i l eges to Buddhism. According t o i t , 
a l l c i t i z e n s had the r ight to freedom of thought, conscience 
and r e l i g ion . But Buddiiism had the 'foremost place*. This 
d iscr iminat ion provided complicat ions. 
The psychological problem was also t h e r e . Both the 
co:^imunities remain suspicious of one another. The s i tua t ion can 
be characrer ised as a majority suffering from a minority 
complex because of the fact tha t across the country the mino-
r i t y i s a majori ty. So t h i s 'minori ty complex' of Sinhalese 
majority in the is land has led theSinhalese p o l i t i c i a n s on the 
road to repression of the Tamil minor i ty . The people of Indian 
or ig in in Sri Lanka including the t ea planta t ion labour and 
other s e t t l e r s , although geographically and even soc ia l ly 
separated from the indigineous Tamil • were also counted by 
the Sinhalese as a po t en t i a l force h o s t i l e to them. 
I t i s c lea r from the above discussion that the problem 
of language, education, employment, colonisat ion of Tamil areas 
for the Sinhalese and various other misunderstandings created 
fears , which nurtured a feeling of insecur i ty and d i s t r u s t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst the minority community youth. 
* * * * 
A 
Chapter - h 
SRI LANKAN ATTITUDE 
Most of the problems, which are d i scussed i n Chapters 
2 and 3 , were c r e a t e d by the 3 r i Lankan Governments through 
v a r i o u s l e g i s l a t i o n s which were d i s c r i m i n a t o r y towards Tamil 
community. S imul taneous ly , t h e r e were p o s i t i v e e f f o r t s a l so 
t o solve the problems. Al l t h e moves of .Government are d i scussed 
here to make the governmental a t t i t u d e c l e a r . The response 
from the Tamil l e a d e r s h i p and the S inha la s o c i e t y i s a l so 
d i scussed . 
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A. GUVERNMSNTAL ATTITUDE? 
S r i Lankans t r a d i t i o n a l l y have not been very mobi le , 
o r i Lanka ' s demographic h i s t o r y shows the ex t en t t o which 
popu l a t i on growth has been a f fec ted by t h i s l a r g e s c a l e migra-
t i o n of a mobile Ind ian labour f o r c e . By the 1930s labour 
a b s o r p t i o n in the p l a n t a t i o n i n d u s t r i e s reached s a t u r a t i o n 
l e v e l s , and the growing problem of unemployment in the country 
a rose .^ A growing i n t e r e s t i n the r e p a t r i a t i n g su rp lu s Indian 
l abour a l so emerged at t h i s t i m e . S r i Lanka demonstrated t h a t 
n a t i o n a l consc iousness would be based upon 'Exclus ive* concept 
of be long ingness and wot the ' I n c l u s i v e ' o n e ' . The Tamil t e a -
e s t a t e workers of Ind i an ances t ry were immediately def ined as 
non-be longers . In 1950 not only e a s t a t e workers but a l so 
Ceylon Tami ls , whose h i s t o r y on the i s l a n d s t r e t c h e d 2^00 years 
back , found themselves i s o l a t e d as non-belongers when 
Mr. Bhandarnaike dec ided t o p lay the S inha la card in t h e 
p o l i t i c a l game. 
Before independence, when Jawahar Lai Nehru v i s i t e d 
S r i Lanka in 1939t ^ i r John Kotelawala b l u n t l y t o l d him t h a t . 
1. Kora le , R.B.M. and o t h e r s , "Dimensions of Return Migrat ion 
in S r i Lanka" in Asian Popu l a t i on Studies^ S e r i e s No. 79 , 
Re tu rn ing Migrant . . Workers: Exp lo ra to ry Studies/ECOSOC for 
Asia and the P a c i f i c , U.N. 1986) , p . 15 . 
2 . T inke r , Hugh, "South Asia at Independence: I n d i a - P a k i s t a n 
and Sr i Lanka" in Wilson, A . J . , ( e d . ) , S t a t e s of South Asi^. 
Problems of N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n , (New D e l h i , 1982) , p 2A 
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"Indians would not be employed in S r i Lanka when there were not 
enough jotis for the local populat ion". More remarks made by 
S i r John Kotelawala show the Sinhalese a t t i t u d e towards the 
Tamils ( to whom they regarded as al iens) . Alluding to a sugges-
t i o n tha t Sinhalese labour might take the place of Indian labour 
so t ha t the l a t t e r might be sen t back t o India , Sir John sa id , 
"If we are going to replace the Indian cool ie with Sinhalese 
labour, I say, God help Ceylon, I wi l l be worse than allowing 
the Indian coolie to come in . Once the Sinhalese came as 
c o o l i e s , they wil l lose the des i re for land, they wil l lose the i r 
c u l t u r e and s e l f - r e s p e c t , they wil l be a wandering se t of 
2 
people in Ceylon". This narrow e thnocen t r i c i ty continued even 
a f t e r independence. 
The most important l e g i s l a t i v e enactment affect ing 
migration is the Immigrants and Emigrants Act. No. 20 of 1948. 
This Act repealed the Aliens Regis t ra t ion Ordinance No. 30 of 
3 
1935 and Passport Ordinance No, 20 of 1923. Although the 
background for the 194 8 Act was mainly based on the problem of 
Indian e s t a t e labour, i t provided for comprehensive regulat ion 
1. Ramaswamy, P . , New Deljti jin^ Sfi Lapka t ^our Decades of 
P o l i t i c s and DiploroacvV (New Delhi, 1987), p . 19. 
2* Ibi( j • , pp. 35-36. 
3 . Asian Population Studies , op.ciip., p . 15. 
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of inf lux and exodus of Persons to and from the country. I t 
a lso provided for a Control ler of Immigration and Emigration, 
and the Depariment of Immigration, and Emigration was establ ished 
in 19^9 J P r io r to 19^9 and the enforcement of the immigrants 
and Emigrants Act, there was no ef fec t ive control over the 
entry of non-nat ionals , for residence or employment in to 
Ceylon.^ Before t h i s Act was passed in 19^8, S.W,R.D. 
Bhandarnaike, who in l a t e r years became the Prime Minister of 
Sri Lanka sa id , "I s h a l l die a happy man when the l a s t Indian 
le-aves these (Sr i Lankan) shores".-^ 
Changes in Government policy on migration from time 
t o time influenced l e g i s l a t i v e developments and the functions 
and a c t i v i t i e s en t rus ted to the Departoent of Immigration and 
Emigration. The other relevant Acts tha t were subsequently 
u 
passed between 19^8 and I985f run as follows»^ 
Ci t izenship Act:,No. 18 of 19^-8; 
Indian and Pakis tan i Residence (Citizenship) 
Act No. 3^+ of 19^9; 
Compulsory Public Service Act No. 70 of I96I ; 
^ ' I b i d . , p . 16. 
2 . Jacob, Lucy, Sr i Lanka ; From Dominion to Repg^piic 
(New Delhi, 1973)', pp. "lO^-'lb?. 
3 . Ramaswaray, P . , op .c i t .^ p . I78 . 
h. Asian Population Studies , op . c i t . y pp. 15-16. 
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Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act 
No. 14 of 1967; 
Temporary Residence Tax Act No. 15 of 197i; 
Passport (Regulations) and Exit Permit Act 
No. 63 of 1971; 
Foreign Employment Agency Act No. 32 of 1980; 
and 
Sr i Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Act 
No. 21 of 1985. 
In t h i s way, there were continuous blows on migrant 
populat ion in Sr i Lanka p a r t i c u l a r l y on the Indian migrants. 
Donoughmore Const i tu t ion of 1931 granted universal adult 
f ranchise , but the Sinhalese opposed i t as t ha t would grant the 
vote to "Indians" in tea e s t a t e s qualifying as ' c r e d e n t i a l s ' 
and the Sinhalese would be a t disadvantage in Kandy. And th i s 
did happen. Out of seven sea t s in Kandyan cons t i tuenc ies , si>: 
were won by Indian Tamil candidates in 194 7. But a f t e r theii-
disfranchisement by enactment of 1948, the people of Indian 
o r ig in were out of the periphery of Ceylon's national p o l i t i c s , 
though they number including some 700,000 p lan ta t ion labourers , 
2 
nearly a mi l l ion . 
1. Ramaswamy, P . , o p . c i t . , p . 106. 
2« Ibid,., p . 112. 
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J i r John Kotelawala stood up b lun t ly against Indian 
Ta^iils. In h i s autobiography 'iV Prime Min i s t e r ' s Di^^ry*, 
he sa id , "we are c e r t a i n l y not going to keep Indians in 
employment when our own people are unemployed. When i t was a 
question of retrenchment, the Indians had to go". Since 
1956, c u l t u r a l ethnlcism of Sinhalese (Sinhala for Sinhalese) 
became -i cen t ra l concern of Sri Lankan p o l i t i c s . This happened 
la rge ly because the two major p a r t i e s United National Party 
(UNP), and the Sri Lanka Federal Party (SLFP) , competed for 
2 
maximum support of the dominant Sinhala community. 
In 1958, the Federal Party (which was formed in 
I9I+9 in pro tes t of denia l of franchise to Indian Tamils) was d e c 
lared i l l e g a l as a preventive measure against further de te r io ra -
t ion of the c r i s i s and i t s members were placed in preventive 
de ten t ion . In 196^-, due to the e f fo r t s of the Prime Minister 
of Ind ia , Sri Lai Bahadur Shas t r i , an agreement regarding the 
c i t i zensh ip of Indian Tamils in Sr i Lanka, was signed. The 
Sr i Lankan counterpar t , Mrs, Sirimavo Bhandarnaike signed i t^ 
taking the t h e o r e t i c a l l i a b i l i t y to implement i t e f fec t ive ly , 
but fa i led to do so in p r a c t i c e . 
1. I b i d . , p . h-h. 
2. Gupta Anirudha, "Cultural Dimension" in Prasad, Bimal (ed.) 
Regional Cooperation in South Asia : Problems and Prospects 
(New Delhi, I989) , p . 1M. 
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In 1972, new cons t i tu t ion was brought. This made 
Ceylon a Republic and gave a new name, Sr i Lanka. So far 
as the mino r i t i e s , the Tamil in p a r t i c u l a r , were concerned, 
the new cons t i tu t ion negatived past commitments and 
s igni f ied objectives to counter the most important of the 
Tamil demands. I t entrenched the uni tary s t a t e s t ructure 
ignoring the Federal P a r t y ' s demand for Tamil autonomy 
-I 
through a federal set up. The 'S inhala Only' enactment of 
1956 acquired c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a tu s through section 7 of the 
Cons t i tu t ion . Though the Tamil Language (special provisions)-
Act of 1958 (fur ther vnended in I966) qual i f ied the 19^6 
enactment to permit the l imited use of Tamil in the northern and 
eas te rn provinces, the new cons t i t u t i on i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d the 
disadvantageous pos i t ion of the Tamils in the res t of the 
country . The Sinhala Xanguage was t o be the sole language 
for a l l the laws and enactments as well as for the courts and 
2 
t r i buna l s throughout the i s l and . 
1972 Const i tu t ion also accorded spec ia l priveleges to 
Buddhism. According t o $,6, " i t s h a l l be the duty of the s ta te 
to protec t and foster Buddhism. But at*the same time a l l other 
1, Mohan Ram, Sr i Lanka ; The Fractured Island (New Delhi. 
1989), p . UlT, — * 
2. Ibidf 
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r e l ig ions were assured complete freedom of wo;x5hip". With 
the dec la ra t ion of the nat ion as a ' un i t a ry s t a t e ' the 
Cons t i tu t ion of 1972 re jected the Tamil demand for the federa-
t i o n . But the most f lagrant act of discrimination was the 
d i s t i n c t i o n the new cons t i tu t ion made between 'persons ' and 
' c i t i z e n s ' in the matter of fundamental r i g h t s . While a l l 
persons were equal before law, only a c i t i z e n had r igh t s of 
freedom of thow^ht, conscience and r e l i g i o n , speech, publica-
t i o n , movement, choice of residence and .the r ight t o promote 
his own c u l t u r e . The lose rs here were the s t a t e l e s s plantat ion 
workers of Indian o r ig in who had los t t h e i r c i t i zensh ip in 
2 
19l^.8-^9. Tamils then concluded t h a t the doors were f inal ly 
closed against them and a l l the Tamil p a r t i e s , the Federal Par ty , 
the Tamil Congress and Ceylon Worker's Congress (of Indian 
p lan ta t icn labourers) formed the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 
1972. This was a front for a g i t a t i o n . 
In 1970s, the Sinhalese saw themselves as a deprived 
lo t v i s - a - v i s the Tamils who had b e t t e r access t o education 
and employment. The Sinhala majority now t r i e d affirmative 
discr iminat ion through ' s t anda rd i za t ion ' of works to deprive the 
1. Saran, P . , Government and P o l i t i c s of Sr i Lanka. 
(New Delhi , 1982), p . 30. 
2, Mohan Ram, o p . c i t . , p . 8^-, 
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Tamils of the advantage they enjoyed. In the face of the 
government's po l i c i e s there was l i t t l e the Tamils could do. 
The harrassment of workers of Indian or ig in af ter na t iona l iza t ion 
(company owned tea e s t a t e s both foreign and domestic were na t io -
1 
nalized in 1972 and 1975), has been one of the major complaints 
of the CWC, the l a rges t p lan ta t ion workers* union. I t was said 
t h a t , "thousands of Indian l aboure rs , t h e i r wives and children 
had been ejected from the na t iona l ized e s t a t e s and were roaming 
2 
the countryside begging for food". 
Secession has always been the l a t en t option of oppressed 
minor i t ies in a p l u r a l society and the Tamils were driven to it 
In 1976, when TUF was renewed as Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF), hardening Sinhala a t t i t ude fur ther . 
By 1977, the Sr i Lankan p o l i t i c a l system had thus 
achieved a high degree of ethnic c en t r a l i z a t i on in favour of 
the Sinhala-Buddhist major i ty . Any adjustment of Tamil ethnic 
i n t e r e s t s was seen at the cost of the majori ty. As a r e s u l t , 
the Tamils were p o l i t i c a l l y marginalized, and were shown to be 
i r re levan t to the system. 
1. The Surona World Year Book. Vol. I I (London, I989) , p . 2372. 
2 . A l i , 3 . Ashfaq, Indian Overseas^ (Bhopal, 198^), p . 78. 
3 . Mohan Ram, o p . c i t . , p . ^O. 
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In the 1977 e l e c t i o n s , the UNP was returned with 
a f ive -s ix th majority and gave the is land the p re s iden t i a l 
cons t i tu t ion in 1978. The new cons t i tu t ion only gave further 
legit imacy to the Sinhala-Buddhist ideology. Whil£ re ta ining 
the majority Sinhala language as the o f f i c i a l language of 
the Republic, the new cons t i tu t ion conferred an enhanced 
•nat ional language s t a t u s ' to Tamil.'' I t also reaffirmed the 
spec ia l pos i t ion accorded to Buddhism in the 1972 cons t i -
t u t i o n . I t sought to protec t and fos ter not jus t Buddhism 
but the Buddhist Sasana (order ) .^ I t firmly declared tha t Sri 
Lanka would be a uni ta ry s t a t e yielding no ground to the 
demand for e i the r a federal set up or regional autonomy for 
the Tamil regions . 
The iJayewardene Government claimed t h a t , " i t had 
done more for the Tamils than any previous regime had done. 
Tamil had been cons t i t u t i ona l l y recognised as a na t iona l 
language along with Sinhalese and made the language of admi-
n i s t r a t i o n in Tamil a reas , Tamil p lanta t ion workers of 
Indian or ig in had also been granted vot ing r igh t s in loca l 
government e l e c t i o n s , and the dual system of c i t i zensh ip -
c i t i z e n by descent and c i t i zensh ip by r e g i s t r a t i o n - had been 
1. Singh, Rai , "Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Rela t ions" in 
Pharmdasani. M.D. ( e d . ) , 3 r i Lanka; An Island in Cr is i s 
(Varanasi, I988), p . 86. 
2. Mohan Ram, o p , c i t . , p . 85. 
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done away wi th . 
This conc i l i a to ry approach did not , however, mate-
r i a l l y changed the s i t ua t ion and in 1978, the Liberat ion 
Tigers of Tamil Eelara (LTTEi a m i l i t a n t branch of TULF, s ta r ted 
sabotaging and k i l l i ng police o f f i c e r s . The Jayewardene 
government reacted by enacting the Proscribing of the LTTE 
Law (No. 16 of 1978). In July 1979, the government repealed 
t h i s law and replaced i t with the Preveption of Terrorism 
Act (No. lf8 of 1979) which gave wide powers of search and 
a r res t to the police and the army. He declared a s t a t e of 
emergency in the Tamil areas from Ju ly 11 , 1979. 
At the same t ime, a new philosophy was epitomized in 
a t h e s i s propounded by Cyr i l Mathew, one of President 
Jayewardene's min is te rs during the July 1983 Tamil massacres. 
He cont ro l led the rul ing p a r t y ' s labour wing, the J a t i ya Sevaka 
Sangaraaya (National Worter 's Organisat ion) , which was believed 
to have played a leading role in the massacres. According to 
Mathew's t he s i s ( inspi red from the Mahatir-Bin-Mohammad, a 
Malaysian p o l i t i c a n , who l a t e r on became his count ry ' s Prime 
Min i s t e r ) , the other r a c i a l groups should not be allowed t o 
1, 3in:gh,Rai, o p . c i t . ^ p . 9U. 
2. Mohan Ram, 3r i Lanka ; The Fractured Islan^ (New Delhi, 
1989), p . 86i 
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compete with the dominant ethnic group. According t o him, 
in 3 r i Lanka, the Tamil minority dominated everything from 
the professions t o t rade and commerce. This could not be 
t o l e r a t ed forever. Worse, the Tamil wanted a country of 
t h e i r own. According to Mathew, the Sinhala people were ready 
to prevent the d iv is ion of the country by non-violent or 
v io len t methods. His t h e s i s with i t s immense appeal t o the 
Sinhalas helped i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e p o l i t i c a l violence aimed 
against the Tamils, which led t o violence in 1977» followed 
by more violence in I98I and the worst ever in 1983. 
Tamil r i o t s in 1 977 and 1981 were different from the 
r i o t s in 19^8. These were not d i r ec ted merely against the 
ethnic Tamils (12.5% of t o t a l population) or l imited t o the 
areas inhabited by them. These r i o t s extended to the Tamils 
of Indian or ig in (5.5i^ of t o t a l population) l i v ing mostly in 
the p lan ta t ion d i s t r i c t s . More than 50,000 Tamil p lanta t ion 
workers had sought asylum in the North. They \>ecame the 
2 
t a r g e t s of organised a t t a c k s . The reason for the spreading 
of the violence to cover a l l segments of the count ry ' s Tamil 
population was that the p lan ta t ion Tamils, though they did not 
support the secession demand, had begun making common cause 
1. Singh, 3.B.,"Tamil Minority in S r i Lanka',',in 
Dharmdasani, M.D, ( e d , ) , Sr i Lanka : An Island in Cr is is 
(Varanasi, I988), p . 157. 
2 . Kokikara, Shelton, U., Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka 
(Delhi, 1982), p . lfl+. 
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with the ethnic Tamils. This was d is turb ing the Sinhalas . 
After 1983, the prevai l ing s i t ua t i on , poignantly 
summed up by a Tamil for Michael Hamlyn of 'The Times* shows 
the a t t i t u d e of Sri Lanka towards t he Tamils, **Yon are shot 
i f you stay at home, you are shot i f you go out/ you are shot 
i f you run when challenged, you anfe shot i f you s t a n d s t i l l . 
What can we do?" Thousands of Tamils fled in to the jungle 
or crossed the sea t o India, t h e fa te of Tamils i f they 
remained was c l ea r , because Jayewardene had declared tha t 
2 Tamil te r ror i sm continued there would be a thousand July 1983s". 
After July 1983 r i o t s , when Mrs. Indira Gar*ahi sent Foreign 
Minister Narsimha Rao t o Colombo, the ges ture was angri ly 
resented by the au tho r i t i e s in Sr i Lanka as a t y p i c a l case of 
a 'Big Brother ' t h r e a t . President. J .R. Jayewardene himself 
declared, "he would a l ly himself with the dev i l i f necessary 
t o pro tec t the country against invasion from outside•*. But soon 
the Sri Lankan Govt, woke up and rea l ized the imperatives for r e -
solving the e thnic c r i s i s . In 1984, at the i n i t i a t i v e of Ind ia ' s 
1 . S i n g h , S . B , , auLtSLit.*. P» 1^7. -v..^.,. 
2 . Mohan Ram, o n . c l t • . p . 8 8 . y'^"*" ^*^ 
3 . Ramaswamy, P . , o p . c i t . , p p . 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 . | •«/ P ) o I Q r \ Q 
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mediat ion, the UNP government prepared to convene an All Party 
Conference (APC) in which i t affirmed to give the Tamils 
d i r e c t l y e lected D i s t r i c t Counc i l s , In tex-Dis t r i c t coordina-
t ing and col labora t ing u n i t s , and a second chamber t o ensure 
a more equi table exercise of p o l i t i c a l power by a l l members or 
sect ions of a mul t i -e thnic society. ' ' But i t fa i led and from 
198^ onwards m i l i t a r i z a t i o n by the government began yi a 
massive scale with the ' dec la ra t ion of a ' s ecu r i ty zone' in 
north and east Sr i Lanka. 
again in 1985, there were e f fo r t s to solve the c r i s i s . 
Due to the e f for t s of India , two rounds of t a l k s were held In 
Thimpu. But these t a lk s fa i led as both the p a r t i e s were 
firm on t h e i r s tands . The Sri Lankan delegation had outr ight ly 
re jec ted four p r inc ip le s of the Tamil groups for the reason 
t h a t , "they cons t i t u t e a negation of the sovereignty and 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Sr i Lanka, they are detr imental t o a 
United Lanka and are inimical t o the i n t e r e s t s of the several 
2 
communities and re l ig ion in Sr i Lanka". 
1. Sahadevan P . , Nayak, 3 .C. , "Ethnic Competition and 
Nation Building in b r i Lanka", in Dharmdasani, M.D. 
( e d . ) . Sr i Lanka ; An Island in C r i s i s . (Varanasi. 1988), 
pp. 66-67. 
2 . Sr i Lanka, Department of Information, The Thimpu Talks; 
The Stand taken by Sr i Lanka. Text of the opening statement 
made by Dr. H.W. Jayewardene, (Colombo, 1985), p . 3 . 
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I t is t rue that Sr i Lankan a t t i t u d e towards Tamil 
minority has been hard from the very beginning, but i t i s 
a lso important to remember tha t no country would l i k e to 
t o l e r a t e the t a l k s of secession too long, and at one time 
or the o ther , even the most moderate would be forced to come 
out openly against the s e c e s s i o n i s t s . So by 1987, the Sr i 
had 
Lankan armed forces / f ina l ly come of age. And S r i Lankan 
Government t r i e d t o sought help from various foreign coun-
2 
t r i e s to chalk out plans to meet the Tiger t h r e a t . 
At l a s t , due to e f fo r t s of Rajiv Gandhi^the Prime 
Minis ter of Ind ia , an accord was signed between India and 
Sr i Lanka. The s igna tor ies were Rajiv Gandhi and the Sri 
Lankan President J .R. Jayewardene. Under t h i s agreement, 
Indian Peace Keeping Force ( IPHF) was sent to Sri Lanka to 
c rea te peace in nor th-eas t provinces. The north and east 
provinces were merged in to one and e lec t ions were held . But 
soon, i t was r e a l i s e d tha t "a foreign force i s se .^dom welcomed 
in any country for a long time and the Indian army i s no 
exception. They are seen as l i b e r a t o r s ne i ther by the Sinhalese 
•a 
nor by the Tamils".-" And in September 1989, an Indo-Lankan 
1 . Sinh, Rai , "Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Re la t ions" , in 
Dharmdasani, M.D. ( e d . ) , op .c i t . , . p . 100 
2. Suryanarayan, P . S . . The Peace Trap : An Indo Sr i Lankan 
P o l i t i c a l Cr is i s f (Madras, I988) , pp. 39-^0. 
3 . Sengupta, Bhabani, "Fall out of Lanka Accord", 
The Hindyistan Times, 5 February I988, 
80 
Agreement was s igned on the complete wi thdrawal of the IPKF 
from S r i Lanka by the y e a r end. I t was pu l l ed out completely 
in March 1990. 
The idea of r e p l a c i n g the accord by a more comprehensive 
t r e a t y was mooted by Former S r i Lankan P r e s i d e n t Jayewarddne 
as e a r l y as January I988 and again by h i s successor R. Premdasa, 
But I n d i a found t h e i r d r a f t s t o be t o o vague and prepared 
a r e v i s e d document for t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n bu t S r i Lanka 's 
1 
zes t had a l ready faded o u t . 
Despi te the e f f o r t s of v a r i o u s governments in S r i 
Lanka, from D.S. Senanayake t o R. Premdasa t o solve t h £ 
vexed problem*, the S inha la m a j o r i t y h indered them t o implement 
the concess ions towards the Tamil p e o p l e , 
(B) TAMIL RSSPONSB; 
The views of Ind i an Tamils can not be de r ived e a s i l y as 
they / s i l e n t people e l e c t o r a l l y . Due t o the h i g h e s t l e v e l of 
i l l i t e r a c y and the geograph ica l i s o l a t i o n , they gave a l l e g i e n c e 
1. Mishra , P.K. "Indo Lanka Ties : Can a Trea ty h e l p ? " in 
Link (New D e l h i ) , k March I 9 9 0 , p . 10. 
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only t o t h e i r own l eade r s . In the p l a n t a t i o n s , the 
leadership was with an Indian Tamil, Mr. Natesa Iye r . 
La te r , when the Ceylon Indian (Workers') Congress was formed 
in 19 -^0 by Mr. S. Thondaman, the p lan ta t ion labourers came 
under i t s wing.^ He became the sole leader of these people. 
2 
"Mr. Thondaman ru les the country" i s a b e l i e f widespread 
among Kandyan Sinhalese . 
The Ceylon Tamils remain overwhelmingly under conser-
vat ive and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t leaders and cl ing to their 
t r a d i t i o n a l soc ia l p r a c t i c e s . On the whole they are ready to 
compromise with the Sinhala majority in re turn for f a i r ly l imi-
ted concessions. The Indian Tamils remain engrossed in trade 
union s t ruggles and in the determination of t h e i r c i t i z ensh ip . 
The unions are almost the only p o l i t i c a l form of 
pressure open to the e s t a t e worters who are disfranchised and 
geographically i so l a t ed , being very unl ikely t o Join the 
Sinhalese dominated p a r t i e s in t h e i r a reas . The whole p o l i -
t i c a l l i f e of the l a rges t single p ro l e t a r i an force in Sri Lanka 
cent res on the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) led by 
Mr. Thondaman and Democratic Workers' Congress (DWC) led by 
1, Ramaswamy, P . , New Delhi and Sr i Lanka ; Four Decades of 
P o l i t i c s and Diplomacy (New Delhi^ 1987)^ p . k^ , 
2 . Jupp, James, S r i Lanka-Third World Democracy (London, 1978), 
p . 1^5. 
.82 
A. Aziz. Because of t h e i r overwhelmingly Indian Tamil 
membership, they can only exert p o l i t i c a l pressure to a 
l imited extent . Since I96O, they have done t h i s by aligning 
themselves with one or other of the major elements in the 
Sinhalese party s t rugg le , Mr. Thondaman, af ter a b r i e f 
a l l iance with Mrs. Bhandaranaite of SLFP, in I96O became firmly 
a l l i e d with the UNP and in 1965, Dudley Senanayake nominated 
him t o Parliament. A Aziz, the r i v a l leader of DWC, though 
c r i t i c a l of the communalism of SLFP, was always iden t i f i ed 
with Left and was nominated to Parliament by Mrs. BhandaranaikB 
in 1970. As pressure groups,the main task of both CWC and 
DWC has been over the representa t ion or na tu ra l i za t i on of 
1 
Indian Tamils. 
T i l l 19^9, Mr, Ponnambalara Ramnathan had been leader 
of a l l Tamils but when he joined Senanayake cabine t , a big 
chunk of h i s partymen led by Mr. Chelavanayakam broke away and 
formed the Federal Pa r ty , making the very beginning of the 
p o l i t i c s of dissent among Tamils in Sr i Lanka. Federal Party 
redrafted the aims and goals of the Tamils as a whole, one 
of which was tha t the Tamil speaking population should include 
the Indi.an Tamils of the t ea e s t a t e s . At the convention of 
1- JLkliL., p. 177. 
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Federal Party in Trincomalee in 19^6, Mr. Chelavanayakam 
l i s t e d 3 demands: 
"(a) an autonomous region for the 
indigenous Tamils-speaking people 
comprising the northern and the eas tern 
provinces linked t o the r e s t of the island 
under a federal set up; (b) pa r i t y of 
s t a tus for the Tamil language with the 
Sinhalese language; and (c) c i t i zensh ip 
r igh ts for the Indian Tamils who wished 
t o make Ceylon t h e i r permanent home". 
Since Independence, u n t i l 1956, the Sr i Lankan Tamil 
P o l i t i c s was one of responsive co-operat ion. The Tamil 
congress had pa r t i c ipa t ed in the government since 191+7. In 
1956 ( a f t a r the 3LFP won the e lec t ions r iding a wave of 
Sinhala - Buddhist nationalism) began the Tamil non-violent 
2 
non cooperation move in the hope of securing t h e i r demands. 
At th i s t ime, the Federal Pa r ty , through a pact between i t s 
leader SJV Che lav an ay a kam and the Prime Minister SWRD 
Bhandarnaike in 1957, t r i e d to win some of i t s demands. But 
1, Ramaswamy, P . , op . c i t , ^ pp. 113-11^. 
2 . Mohan Ram, Sr i _Lanka ; The Fractured Island (New Delhi ,I989), 
p . ^ 2 . 
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Bhandarnftike abrogated i t in 1958 under Sinhala pressure . 
In 1958, there were anti-Tamil r i o t s over the language i s sue . 
The Federal Party launched a peaceful ag i t a t i on over the 
language issue in Tamil majority northern provinces . After 
sometime/ in 1964, the FP moved one s t ep fur ther and organised 
a 'Tamil only ' campaign in which i t appealed to the Tamil 
speaking people t o t r ansac t a l l t h e i r business in Tamil. 
These campaigns caused problems for the cen t ra l adminis-
t r a t i o n . 
In 1965 e l e c t i o n s , the Federal Party with fourteen 
sea t s supported UNP, which formed a government. In the same 
year a pact was signed between SJV Chelavanayakam and the 
Prime Minis ter Dudley Senanayake. But the promises made in 
t h i s pact were not fu l ly honoured and the pact did not end the 
c o n f l i c t . Before the 19 72 Const i tu t ion of S r i Lanka was passed, 
the Tamil p a r t i e s demanded a ban on cas te discrimination and 
end t o the d i s t i n c t i o n between Ceylon Tamils and Plantat ion 
Tamils of Indian o r i g i n . But the Const i tut ion 
did not represent a consensus. The p lan ta t ion Tamils were 
not represented in the Consti tuent Assembly. In p r o t e s t , the 
1. I b i d . , p . 44 
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Federal Par ty , the Tamil Congress, the Slathamilar Ottumani 
Munol and theAll Ceylon Tamil Conference joined together in 
1972 to form the Tamil United Front (TUF) to protect ' the 
freedom digni ty and r igh t s of the Tamil peop le ' . "The TUF 
2 
had adopted a s ix point act ion plan for the Tamils: 
1, A. defined place for the Tamil language; 
2» 3 r i Lanka should Me a secular s t a t e ; 
3 , Fundamental r i gh t s of e thnic minor i t ies 
should be embodied in the Cons t i tu t ion ; 
h. Ci t izenship for a l l who applied for i t ; 
5. Decent ra l i sa t ion of the adminis t ra t ion; and 
6, The caste system to be abolished. 
In October, 1972, the TUF launched a non-violent 
s t ruggle to achieve i t s ob jec t ives . But various discriminatory 
po l i c i e s of Sri Lankan government, led them in May I976 t o 
adopt a h i s t o r i c a l reso lu t ion c a l l i n g for complete independence 
of the Tamil na t ion . The name was changed to tha t of Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF). I t denounced the I972 
cons t i t u t i on saying i t had reduced the Tamils to a ' s lave 
1. Singh, S.B. "Tamil Minority in Sr i Lanka", in Dharmdasani, 
M.D. (ed.) S r i Lankat An Island in Cr i s i s (Varanasi^ I988), 
P. 155. 
2 . lb id X. 
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na t ion ' by the Sinhalas . 
The Tamil youths were not s a t i s f i e d with the conser-
vat ive Tamil p o l i t i c a l l eadersh ip . V e l l u p i l l a i Prabhakaran, 
then 13, formed the Tamil New Tigers in 1972, which became 
Liberat ion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE) four years l a t e r . 
A. spec ia l session of Parliament in ea r ly August 1983 amended 
2 
the cons t i tu t ion through the Sixth Amendment to ban p o l i -
t i c a l p a r t i e s advocating secession. TULF was banned and was 
s t r ipped of i t s represen ta t ion in Parl iament, because i t 
refused to t a t e the ant i -secess ion oath. But i t was s t i l l 
the only p o l i t i c a l par ty of the Tamils, while the guer i l l a 
movement h-3xi grown and fragmented in to numerous groups. 
Foremost among them was the LTTE, s t ructured as an urban 
g u e r i l l a organisat ion. I t s main influence was in Jaffna. 
The second l a r g e s t , but m i l i t a r i l y not as s i g n i f i c a n t , 
g u e r i l l a group was the people ' s Liberat ion Organisation of 
Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), set .up in I98O by Uraa Maheswaran, who 
was the Secretary General of the LTTE before he founded his 
own organisa t ion . He la id premium on mass p o l i t i c a l action 
1 . Mohan Ram, op.ci,ttf p . ^ 3 , 
2 . Tambiah, S . J , , S r i Lanka ; Ethnic Frac t r ic lde and the 
Dismantling of DemocraCY^ (London^ 1Q86^T P - ^'^- The 
Sixth Amendment requires tha t a l l members of Parliament, 
office holders of various kinds, and even every attorney 
at Law shal l make an oath to the effect that "they wil l 
not d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , in or outside Sri Lanka 
support espouse, promote, f inance, encourage or advocate 
the establishment of a separate State within the t e r r i t o r y 
of Sr i Lanka." 
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and disapproved of the h i t -and-run t a c t i c s of the LTIE. He 
r ea l i s ed the importance of Indian Tamils. He wr i t e s , 
"A factor which may well act as a c a t a l y s t to give a thrus t 
to democratic move i s the emergence of the Indian Tamils 
as a solidphalanx of the l a rges t organised workers' force 
in the i s land . I t i s necessary for us t o make a common cause 
with them", 
The Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students 
(EROS), a small group, was founded by E. Ratnasabapathy in 
London in 1975 and was Marxist-Leninist in o r i en t a t i on . 
Unlike the other groups i t claimed l inks with the planta t ion 
Tamils (which i t refused to c a l l Indian Tamils) and viewed 
them as part of the i s l a n d ' s Tamil people in search of a na t ion . 
The Eelams People ' s Revolutionary Liberation Front 
(EPRLF) under Padmnabh, another Marxist group, was the resul t 
of a s p l i t in the EROS in 1981. I t concentrated i t s ' a c t i v i t i e s 
in the eas tern province. I t became important in recent years 
when i t formed the provinc ia l council under the Chief Minis-
te rohip of i t s leader VaradraJ Perumal in 1987, The other 
i den t i f i ab l e groups of Tamil m i l i t a n t s are the Tamil Eelam 
1. Maheswaran, Uma (Mukundan), "Sr i Lankan Tamil Options" 
"i-n The Hindustan Times. IQ Apri l I986. 
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Liberat ion Organisation (TELO) , the Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Army (TELA), the Tamil Ee lam Liberat ion Front (TELF) , theTamil 
People ' s Democratic Front (TPDE) and the National Front for 
Liberat ion of Tamil Eelam (NELTE), 
The t e r r o r i s t violence has come at the end of what 
the Tamil youth and rad ica l s i n t e rp re t to be a p e r s i s t e n t , 
unfa i r , and sporadical ly t e r r o r i z i n g campaign of discrimina-
t ion and domination on the par t of the^ . majority Sinhalese 
th^ t began espec ia l ly in 19^6, with the accession t o power of 
Buddhist Sinhala Chauvinism. And the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , democ-
r a t i c and lawful ac t ion and p ro t e s t s by the Tamils have been 
rewarded with v io lence . Angered by the imposition of an a l ien 
language, f rus t ra ted without the p o s s i b i l i t y of higher 
education plunged in to the d i s p a i r of unemployment, the Tamil 
youth grew m i l l i t a n t with an iron determination to fight back 
the na t iona l oppression. And t h i s fight is s t i l l continued. 
On the question of outcome of t h i s long drawn s t rugg le , 
Vanniasingham w r i t e s , "Empires have never las ted long and the 
1. Tambiah,3.J, , Sr i Lanka : Ethnic Frac t r ic ide and the 
Dismantling of Democracy, (London, 1986), p . f ? . 
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oinh-^la re ign over Tamils i s bound t o be s h o r t l i v e d " . 
(C) 3INHALA RESPONSE;, 
The S inha lese b e l i e v e t h a t S r i Lanka i s l a r g e l y a 
S inha la -Buddhis t coun t ry and a l l o t h e r r e l i g i o n s or language 
groups are a l i e n s . S r i Lanka, they argue i s the only count ry 
o 
of and for the S inha lese p e o p l e . From the b e g i n n i n g , t h e 
e f f o r t s t o implement v a r i o u s concess ions t o the Tami l s , were 
p r o t e s t e d by the S i n h a l e s e . The government ' s t i m i d i t y was 
because of the S inha la p r e s su re which was backed by the u l t r a -
l e f t J a n a t a Viraukti Peramuna (JVP). I t even at tempted an 
a b o r t i v e I n s u r r e c t i o n in 1971. 
The. n a t i o n a l i s t S inha lese view has been t h a t t he 
r e s i d e n t Ind ian Tamils c o n s t i t u t e t h r e a t t o the S inhalese 
popu l a t i on for many r e a s o n s . In the h i g h l a n d s , Ind ians have 
depr ived the S inha lese of employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s in the 
t e a and rubber p l a n t a t i o n s , and those of them who are t r a d e r s 
1 . Vanniasingham Somasundaram, S r i Lanka ; The Conf l i c t 
Within (New D e l h i , I 9 8 8 ) . The w r i t e r i s t he Former Head 
of Department of Econcxnics a t J a f fna C o l l e g e , who e a r l i e r 
r e t i r e d from the'lColombo Techn ica l Col lege under compul-
s ion of S r i Lanka ' s l i n g u i s t i c p o l i c y . 
2 . Hennayaka, Shanta K., "The Peace Accord and the Tamils 
in S r i Lanka", i n Asian Survey, Vol . XXIX, No. k, Apr i l 
1939. The w r i t e r i s the L e c t u r e r i n Department of 
Geography, U n i v e r s i t y of P e r a d e n i y a , S r i Lanka. 
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drain p ro f i t to Ind ia . But more important, the Sinhalese 
n a t i o n a l i s t s fear the Indian r e s iden t s as a p o l i t i c a l t h r e a t . 
They could in various ways l i nk up with Sri Lankan Tamil 
p o l i t i c a l organizations and have indeed done so. The spark 
of the Sinhalese chauvinism bee fame an all-consuming f i re in 
1983 with the k i l l i ngs of the Tamils. In 1983, the hardened 
oinhala a t t i t ude was re f lec ted in Jayewardene's resolve : 
"nothing wil l happen in our favour u n t i l the t e r r o r i s t s are 
wiped out" . He further sa id , "you can not cure an appendix 
patient, u n t i l you remove the appendix". 
One of the factors which hardenes the Sinhala a t t i tude 
is the factor of s imi l a r i t y and close l i n g u i s t i c in terac t ion 
of Sr i Lankan Tamils with those of Tamil Nadu, leading to the 
se l f -percep t ion of the Sinhalese majority as a l i n g u i s t i c 
minority in the shadow of Ind ia . They are a majority with 
a minority complex, which is pa r t l y the product of S r i Lanka's 
small s i z e , both t e r r i t o r i a l l y and demographic ally.-^ Sinhala 
objections to the idea of a homeland for Tamils run even deeper. 
1. Mohan Ram, Sri Lanka : The Fractured Island (New Delhi: 
1989), p . 5^r 
2 . Wriggins, Howard, Ceylon ; Dilemmas of a New Nation, 
(Pr inceton, N . J . , 1960),p. 252. 
3 . Tamhiah, S,J.^ o p . c j t . , p . 92. 
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"Geographical autonomy based on e t h n i c i t y " , many Sr i Lankans 
argue, " i s not supportable in these times when l i f e i s so 
in te rdependent". 
The 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the role of IPKF 
have been projected by the JVP as contemporary manifestation 
of the proverbial Indian imperialism and expansionism that is 
2 
rooted deeply in the Sinhala Psyche. I t i s evident tha t 
oinhala response towards theproblems of Tamil community i s of 
very r i g i d nature are of not sharing anything with them, 
After t h i s d iscuss ion , i t can be concluded tha t 3 r i 
Lankan Governments adopted a mixed response towards the problems 
of Tamil community. They engineered the discriminatory 
p o l i c i e s towards Tamils, which created problems. At the same 
t ime, there were e f fo r t s to find the so lu t ions . But i t was 
never done wholeheartedly. And the main hinderances came 
from the Sinhala community which always protested concessions 
to Tamils. The Tamils adopted a balanced view and they put 
j u s t i f i a b l e demands to be fu l f i l l ed and agi ta ted for that 
peaceful ly . I t was only in l a t e 1970s, tha t the Tamil youth 
became violent because of the carelessness of government 
towards t h e i r demands. 
1. Chadha, Maya, " Ind ia ' s dilemma in S r i Lanka", in 
The Hindustan Times, 3 August I988. 
2. Muni, 3.D. "JVP and the IPKF", in The .Hindustan Tin.^^ 
29 August 1989. 
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INDIAN ATTITUDE 
Various a f f i n i t i e s between Ind i a and i t s neighbours 
in South As ia , p a r t i c u l a r l y wi th t h e people j u s t ac ross i t s 
b o r d e r s , have o f t en a tendency t o c r e a t e s i t u a t i o n s which 
l ead t o I n d i a ' s involvement in the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of i t s 
n e i g h b o u r s . For example* t h e r e a r e c l o s e a f f i n i t i e s wi th 
Bangladesh on the b a s i s of language and wi th Nepal on the 
b a s i s of r e l i g i o n . So i s t h e case with the neighbour in the 
1 . G i ^ t a , Anirudha/ " C u l t u r a l Dimensions'* in Prasad , 
Bimal (ed.) , Reqione^j. Cooperat ion in Sout^ Asia ; 
Problems and P r o s p e c t s , (New D e l h i / 1989) , p . 13 7. 
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South. As a large number of Indian migrants were residing 
in S r i Lanka, India was not t o t a l l y unaware of t h e i r 
problems. There were l inks between two countr ies even 
before independence« The o f f i c i a l l i nk with S r i Lanka was 
the Ayent to the Government in India whose office was opened 
in Kandy in 1924. His main job was t o watch over the welfare 
of Indian p lan ta t ion labours# t h e i r l iv ing condi t ions , wages 
and occasional incidents which often led to more ser ious 
a g i t a t i o n s . Due to these a g i t a t i o n s , Indian National Congress 
became ser ious about the problems of these people* I t was 
owing t o the local Indian a g i t a t i o n agains t the ' a l l Sinhalese ' 
government t ha t the Indian National Congress deputed Mr. Jawahar 
Lai Nehru to go t o Ceylon in 1939 t o study the s i t u a t i o n and 
explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a se t t l ement . He went t o S r i 
Lanka in 1939 and t a lk s were hel<3 for th ree days. He sa id , 
"I am proud of being an Indian and wi l l not t o l e r a t e a s ingle 
ha i r of an Indian to be touched by any o the r . Indians, 
wherever they are should not sxiffer ind ign i t i e s from anyone. 
I wi l l sooner see Indians crushed to atoms ra the r than suffer 
2 degradation and dishonour'*. 
^mmi^^m^t^ 
1 . Ramaswamy, P . , Ngx pg,;^ h4,.,„^p.d. S j i . I^flpk^ » F9.VU:. JPe.ga^gg 
of Polit^icp ^nd Diplomacy (New De lh i , 1987) , p . 198. 
2. I b i d . , p . 153. 
9^ 
He pleaded with the Slnhala n a t i o n a l i s t s that the 
discr iminat ion and the deduction of a large number of 
Indian employees from government s e rv i ce s , for no other 
reason than they were Indians , contravened in t e rna t iona l 
p rac t ice guided by an ILO convention and was ce r t a in ly 
against the close nature of Indo-Sri Lanka h i s t o r i c a l and 
c u l t u r a l t i e s . But Sinhalese were t o t a l l y unresponsive. 
He had t a lk s on Indian immigrants with the Sinhala Board of 
Minis ters on the need for an understanding for fa irplay and 
j u s t i c e in accordance with accepted in te rna t iona l p r ac t i c e , 
but f a i l ed . During t h i s v i s i t , he thought need for a union 
of p lan ta t ion labourers to look a f te r themselves. He 
suggested the establishment of Ceylon Indian Congress, which 
came in to existence and was inaugurated in an upcountry town 
ca l led Oampola in 19^0. 
After independence, the s i t u a t i o n is complicated by 
the d i f ferent pos i t ions taken by the various Indian govern-
ments. Nehru's governments up to the time of his death 
refused t o get involved and the vast majority of Indian 
Tamils in Sri Lanka was declared to be ' s t a t e l e s s ' , a baffl ing 
1. I b i d . , pp. 16i+-67. 
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problem In In te rns t lona l law. But t h a t does not mean tha t 
India was not looking a t the problem of these people. 
In fact pxjblic a g i t a t i o n in India had been mounting over 
s ince Acts in 1948 and 1949 were passed. Mr. R. Venlcataraman 
then a Congress M.P. from Madras (President of India« a t 
present) had sa id/ " . . . . i t was for the people, of Ceylon t o 
t r y and influence the Ceylon Government to see tha t the 
Indians who had done so much to bui ld up the c i v i l i z a t i o n and 
2 
economy of the is land are not dropped l i ke hot potatoes**. 
At tha t t ime, Ceylon was of the view t h a t she would not accept 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the s t a t e l e s s persons. And the Indian 
pos i t ion had been put forward by Mr. Jawahar Lai Kehru in 
severa l s ta tements . As ea r ly as February 1951, a t the 
Ahmedabad Congress, he saids 
"Ceylon is a small country r a the r a f ra id 
of t h i s grea t big cont inent of India . We 
do not want them to be a f ra id of us . They 
are c u l t u r a l l y the same as we a r e . We want 
them to be f r iendly with us . We do not want 
1. Wilson, A . J . , "Sri Lanka and i t s Future i Sinhalese 
Versus Tamils", in Wilson, A.J . (ed«) The States of 
South Asia t P^obl^m? of National Ip tea ra t ion (New 
Delhi, 1982) , p . 301. 
2. Ramaswamy, P . , p p . c i t « , p . 52. 
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to in te r fe re with t h e i r freedom in any way. 
Vie wish to respect t h e i r independence. But 
n a t u r a l l y , we also want our na t iona ls there 
to be respected. We also want tha t those 
people who thought they were of Indian o r i -
gin, have s e t t l e d in Ceylon to be t r ea ted as 
Ceylonese and we go on pressing for t h a t " . 
In 1951 » J .L . Nehru met Dudley Senanayake, the Prime 
Minister of Sr i Lanka, in London. Talks were held on the 
issue of the s t a t e l e s s p lan ta t ion workers of Indian or ig in . 
Further two pacts were signed with Sir John Kotelawala in 
January and October 1 9 ^ in New Delhi , commonly known as 
Nehru-Kotelawala Pac t s . Though these were s igni f icant 
attempts by the leaders to resolve t h i s human problem, these 
e f fo r t s did not r e su l t in any f ru i t i on . Nehru's successor, 
Lai Bahqdur Shas t r i , presumably because of Ind ia ' s problems 
with Pakistan and People ' s Republic of China, preferred to 
maintain good neighbourly r e l a t i ons with Sri Lanka. 
The CWC leader , Mr. Thondaxnan, the defacto spokesman 
of Indian p lan ta t ion labour in Ceylon, paid a v i s i t to New 
Je lh i in October I963 and, on not ic ing the pressure from 
1• I b i d , , p . ^ 9 . 
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Ceylon on India t o reopen negotiations# contacted several 
a u t h o r i t i e s in New Delhi and t o l d them t h a t , "the problem of 
the s t a t e l e s s in Ceylon had ceased to be an ' Indian problem*. 
I t had become a problem of human r i g h t s . But Shas t r i thought 
t h a t a set t lement with Ceylon was inoperative. Due to his 
e f fo r t s an agreement with S r i Lanka known as Sirimavo-Shastri 
Agreement was signed in 1964. This agreement was signed to 
solve the problem of c i t i z ensh ip of the people of Indian or igin 
in Sr i Lanka. According to t h i s agreement both India and 
S r i Lanka took r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to grant c i t i zensh ip to these 
people in a fixed r a t i o and number. The fa te of remaining was 
t o tie decided l a t e r . Though i t was a good ef for t towards 
solving the biggest problem of Indian migrants/ but the 
implementation was not fu l ly e f f e c t i v e . 
In 1974 the l a t e Indian Prime Minister# Indira Gandhi 
and Sirimavo signed a pact to grant c i t i zensh ip to remaining 
people . These were those 15#000 persons* who were 
l e f t out of the Sirimavo - Shas t r i Agreement of 
1954. Indira Gandhi, had once enunciated the country 's 
foreign pol icy towards i t s neighbours. This came to be known 
as the ' Ind i ra doc t r ine ' in diplomatic par lance . In simple 
1. Ramaswamy, P . , H^yi D^lhi. an^ S r i Lanka (New Delhi, 1987) , 
p . 62. 
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terms, the doctr ine i s as follows: "India w i l l not in te r fe re 
in the in t e rna l a f fa i r s of i t s neighbours, but i t cannot 
remain a s i l en t specta tor i f the domestic events in a 
neighbouring country were t o impinge on Ind i a ' s own ethnic 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s " . ' ' 
In 1931, India had held tha t the anti-Tamil r i o t s were 
an in t e rna l matter of 3r i Lanka, -t^ ut I n d i a ' s involvement in 
the ethnic problem began in a d i rec t and continuing manner 
af te r the communal r i o t s in 1983, when India offered her 
good off ices to explore a p o l i t i c a l set t lement , Ind i ra 
Gandhi's government saw in the Tamil struggle a chance to 
enhance New Delhi ' s p res t ige by projec t ing i t s e l f as the 
'b ig b ro the r ' in the region. Simultaneously, by appealing 
to support the Tamil demands, New Delhi hoped to pick up 
p o l i t i c a l gains in Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu being a very sensi -
t ive s t a t e and playing a c ruc i a l role for safeguarding Tamil 
2 i n t e r e s t s , New Delhi can not afford t o ignore i t s sentiments. 
The DMK party (during the terra of office 1967-77) under 
M. Karunanldhi was sympathetic to the cause of Tamils in .iri 
1. Suryanarayan, P,t>., The Peace Trap (Madras, I988) , 
p. ^. 
2. Mishra, P K, dogth Asiq, in .International Politics, 
(Delhi, 1$8lf)7p7^2TV. 
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Lanka. In such a context , the a t t i t u d e of the Government 
of India and the government of Tamil Nadu to the Tamil 
question in Sr i Lanka, especia l ly t h e i r a t t i tude t o the 
question of Eelara has become a matter of fundamental concern 
for Sr i Lanka government. India has again and again made her 
a t t i t u d e c l e a r . In June 1979, Indian High Commissioner in 
Sr i Lanka Mr. Thomas Abraham sa id , "India would never support 
i 2 
the demand of the TULF for a separate s t a t e in Sr i Lanka". 
But in p r a c t i c e , I n d i a ' s s t ra tegy was slowly becoming c l ea r . 
In i t s essence, the Indian response t o the conf l ic t across 
the Palk s t r a i t was having two fo lds : one was, support to 
Tamil a sp i r a t i ons , short of approving the secess ionis t demand, 
the other was, support t o the mi l i t an t ac t iv i ty aimed at 
secession. 
Indira Gandhi sent her External Affairs Minister P.V. 
Narsimha Rao to Colombo in 1983, while the massacres were s t i l l 
going on. This provoked S r i Lanka. An inv i t a t ion to A. 
/vmrlthalingam, the leader of the TULF, for t a l k s , added to 
the fury. After sometime she named the jou rna l i s t turned 
diplomat G. Pa r tha sa ra th i , a Tamil, as her specia l envoy. He 
1. Kodikara, Shelton, U., Foreign Policy of Sr i Lanka; A Third 
'v^orld Perspective (New Delhi , 1982), pp. M-O-i^ i-l. 
2. Reported in Ceylon Daily News, 25 June 1979. 
3 . Mohan Ram, o p . c i t . ^ p , 123. 
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talked to the Sri Lankan leaders and the TULF and along with 
Pres ident Jayewardene, drafted a set of proposals for devolu-
t ion of power, known as Annexure C, centred on the creat ion 
of separate regional councils for the northern and eas tern 
provinces. These councils were to be granted subs tan t i a l 
powers. But these proposals were re jected by Sinhala opposi-
t i o n . The SLFP denounced them as an Indian product. 3o 
Jayewardene put across a new set of proposals known as 
Annexure B, which did not aim at any meaningful devolution 
of power but merely extended the scheme of decen t ra l iza t ion 
at the d i s t r i c t l eve l t o the provinc ia l l e v e l . This time the 
proposHls were re jected by the TULF. Jayewardene then went 
back t o mi l i t a ry operations against the g u e r i l l a s . But 
in r e t a l i a t i o n , gue r i l l a s massacred 150 Sinhalese at Anura-
dhapura in May 1985. 
Then Jayewardene responded t o I nd i a ' s offer of. 
help to implement the new proposal i . e . Annexure C, After 
h i s v i s i t to New Delhi in June 1985, i t was agreed that India 
would help bringing about a ceasef i re and arrange d i rec t 
negot ia t ions between the Tamil groups, the TULF and the five 
main g u e r i l l a groups the LTTE, PLOTE, EROS, EPRLF and TELO, 
I b i d . . p . 56. 
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In theory the major problem between India and Sri 
Lanka - the problem of the s t a t e l e s s persons had been resolved 
af te r an agreement in 1986 between India and Sri Lantca. But 
the i^sue of the ' s t a t e l e s s ' , l i k e the refugee overflow, was 
only a surface indica t ion of the r e a l compulsions behind 
I n d i a ' s involvement in Sr i Lanka's ethnic c o n f l i c t . The 
r ea l reasons for I n d i a ' s involvement had more to do with i t s 
domestic p o l i t i c a l compulsions on one hand and i t s geostrategic 
concerns on the o ther . Indian Tamil sympathy for the Sri 
Lankan Tamil secess ionis t cause was the domestic compulsion. 
The army a t r o c i t i e s against the c i v i l i a n population in r e l a -
t ion to bolder t e r r o r i s t a t tacks since the end of 198^ has 
1 
resu l ted in an exodus of Tamil refugees ' to India , The 
react ion in Tamil Nadu t o Sr i Lanka's mi l i t a ry operation was 
the determin,ant of New Delhi ' s response. 
J.N. Saxena wri tes^ "The burden on India i s not only 
economic but socia l and p o l i t i c a l a l s o , however, i t has not 
askfid the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) so far 
for any economic a s s i s t ance . As soon as Sr i Lankan refugee 
lands in India» the Indian au tho r i t i e s provide him with a basic 
1, Singh, S,B.^ "Tamil Minority in S r i Lanka" in Dharmdasani, 
M.D. ( e d . ) , S r i Lanka t An Island in C r i s i s . (Varanasi, 
1986), pp. 166-167. 
2. Saxena, J .N. "Legal Status of Refugees : Indian Posi t ion" 
in Indian Journal of In te rna t iona l Law. Vol. 26, I986 (New Delh i ) , p . 507. 
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need k i t . In addi t ion , each refugee (adult) received 55 
rupees each fo r tn igh t , a chi ld gets Rs. 27.50, India has 
made a l l possible arrangements in about 70 camps for t h e i r 
lodging and extended medical f a c i l i t i e s in almost a l l the 
d i s t r i c t s of Tamil Nadu". 
3 r i Lankan Government, in 198M-, rea l i sed the need for 
resolving the c r i s i s . At the i n i t i a t i v e of Ind i a ' s mediation, 
an All Party Conference (APC) was c a l l e d , but i t could not 
succeed. 
Thiropu Talks: 
Following the breakdown of the All Party Conference, 
India had act ively engaged in advancing the process of 
reconc i l i a t ion and negot iat ion between the d r i Lankan 
Government and the Tamil groups. I t acted as a bridge between 
the two d i spu tan t s , involved in the t a sk of creat ing peaceful 
atmosphere for negot ia t ions and arranged, peace t a lk s at 
Thimpu, c a p i t a l of Bhutan. The LTTE, EROS, EPRLF, TELO and 
PLOTE toegther authorised the TJLF t o speak for them 
because i t had experience of negot ia t ions which they lacked. 
The long-divided Tamil movement was able t o express i t s e l f 
uni tedly at l a s t . 
103 
The Sri LanKan delegation placed before the Tamil 
groups the old proposals of the APC of 198^ for the devo-
lu t i on of power. The t a lks broke down af te r two rounds of 
meetings in July and August 1985. The proposals seemed 
inadequate to the Tamil groups, who enunciated four basic 
p r inc ip l e s to be recognised in any new proposal for solving 
the problem. These p r inc ip les werej 
1. Acceptance of the Tamils as a nat ional minori ty, 
2 . Recognition of t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l homelands, 
3 . The r ight to self-deterrairiation; and 
h. Ci t izenship r igh ts and the r ight to l ive in 
3r i Lanka for a l l Tamils who had made Sr i Lanka 
t h e i r homeland. 
But these were rejected by the Sr i Lankan delegation 
and t a l k s f a i l ed . In t h i s atmosphere of fa i lure to reach any 
sett lement between S r i Lankan government and the Tamil groups 
themselves. New Delhi was l e f t with no choice but t o give up 
i t s l imited th i rd party mediatory role to the th i rd party in 
the c r i s i s , India expressed serious concern on 5 January 
1. Mohan Ram, o p . c i t . ^ p . 57. 
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1987 over the economic blockade imposed by the government of Sr i 
Lank«, on the northern peninsula where the Tamil population i s 
concentrated. India o f f i c i a l l y informed the S r i Lankan 
Government on 10 February 1987, t h i t India was suspect ing i t s 
good o f f i c e s in respect of negot ia t ions u n t i l c e r t a i n major s teps 
were taken to c l ear the extra-ordinary s i t u a t i o n , l i k e curbing 
the mi l i tary option arid check on v io lence aga ins t Tamils in north 
2 
e a s t . Other factors which determined India ' s stand on the 
e t h n i c i s sue in Sr i Lanka was the readiness of I s rae l t o help 
Colombo in i t s mi l i tary s o l u t i o n t o the e thnic problem, and the 
3 
growing Pak-Lankan mi l i tary nexus. There i s one ffict we should 
never forget that India can not shed i t s g e o - p o l i t i c a l respons i -
4 b i l i t i e s . Apart from i t , Sr i Lankan contacts with Bri ta in , 
South Africa and America compelled India t o come i n . Washington 
a l s o r e a l i s e d that no s o l u t i o n of the problem was poss ib le unless 
India helped. Al l these s i t u a t i o n s paved a way for the s igning 
of an agreement between India and Sr i Lanka on 29 July 1987. The 
Asian Recorder. Vol. XXXIII, No. 11 , March 12-18, 1987, 
(New Delhi) , p . 19365. 
I b i d . , Vol. XXXIII, No. 20. May 14-20, 1987 (New D e l h i i , 
p . 19465. 
Singh Rai, "Dimensions of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations'* in 
Dharmdasani, M.D. (ed.) op.cj- t • , pp. 104-105. 
Singh, K. Natwar, "India and Her Neighbour" in Mainsty^e^my 
Vol. XXVIII, NO. 11 , Jan. 6, 1990. 
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overr iding object ive of the Accord was t o bring about an end 
to violence* make a l l communities fee l secure/ c rea te an atmosphere 
wherein d i f fe ren t e thnic groups can l ive together in digni ty and 
honour yet preserving t h e i r c u l t u r a l and l i n g u i s t i c i d e n t i t y . 
Most of them to make a l l fee l t ha t they are equal c i t i z ens with 
equal oppor tun i t i e s . This i s to achieve through c rea t ion of 
provincial governments and appropriate devolution of powers/ 
recogni t ion of Tamil and English as o f f i c i a l languages along 
with Sinhala . The most s i g n i f i c a n t concession/ however/ was 
r e l a t e d to the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, 
having one e lec ted provincia l Council, one Governor, one Chief 
Minister and one Board of Min i s t e r s . 
India has taken upon i t s e l f a number of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
to ensure implementation as a l so to under-write Sr i Lanka's unity, 
sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . There is no need for outside 
involven)ent or presence. I t was a l so provided In the Accord tha t 
in the event tha t the Government of S r i Lanka requests the 
Government of India to afford mi l i t a ry ass i s tance to implement 
these proposals the Government of India wi l l co-operate by giving 
t o the Government of S r i Lanka such mi l i t a ry ass i s tance as and 
2 
when reciuested . This was done because good-neighbourliness is 
1. Bhandari, Romesh, "Indo S r i Lanka Accord : The Challenge 
Ahead" in Dharmdasani, M.D. ( e d . ) , op . c l t . * p . 110, 
2. Section 2 (16)(c) of Indo- S r i Lanka Accord, 1987. For 
fu l l Text of the Agreement see ^^ ews Review on South Asia, 
IDSA, New Delhi, September, 1987. 
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a basic t ene t of Ind i a ' s foreign pol icy" . This stems from Ind ia ' s 
awareness tha t her own secur i ty and welfare are inextr icably linked 
with the secu r i ty and welfare of her neighbours. By a l l means, 
t h i s accord was a bold and innovative role for India to take over 
as a r e spons ib i l i t y as South Asia ' s leading power with i t s deep 
concern for the welfare of the e n t i r e population of Sr i Lanka, 
2 Sinhsla and Tamils a l i k e . I t provided the basis for ending 
h o s t i l i t i e s between the Lankan majority Sinhala community and the 
minority Sr i Lankan Tamils. In effect India was required to 
demi l i ta r ize the conf l i c t by means of a peace keeping r o l e . 
Under t h i s agreement India sent the Indian Peace Keeping 
Force (IPKP) to Sr i Lanka. This is not the f i r s t time India has 
sen t i t s troops on e x t r a - c u r r i c u l a r mission. Jawaharlal Nehru's 
government helped King Tribhuvan of Nepal* regain his throne which 
he had almost l o s t to the Ranas, India sent lAF hel icopters to 
S r i Lanka in 1971 a t Mrs. Sirimao Bhandarnaite's reques t . And 
4 
i t brought about the l i b e r a t i o n of Bangladesh. India has had 
the same prime humanatarian object ive in the case of S r i Lankan 
1 . Foreign Affairs Redord, New Delhi, January 1985, p . 13. 
2. Sengupta, Bhabani, "Lankan Policy needs de l i ca te handling" 
in The Hindustan Times, 28 August 1997. 
3 . Hubbel, L. Kenneth, "The Devolution of Power" in Asian Survey, 
(New Delhi) November 1987, p . 1176. 
4 . Dua, H.K. "Launching Peace in S r i Lanka" in The Hindustan 
Times. 5 August 1987. 
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Tamils. Though India i s sympathetic towards Tamils in Sr i Lanka 
she never wanted a Tamil Selam, mainly because India with a l l the 
problems, i t is facing a t home can not afford to support s e p a r a t i s t 
movement across the Palk s t r a i t s . I t was a l so opposed t o a Tamil 
Eelam because of the memories of Tamil separatism which t r i e d to 
acquire a dimension - although unsuccessfully - in the 1950s. 
A Tamil Eelam across the Palk S t r a i t could create* problems in 
Tamil Nadu one day* so ran the unspoken argument. At the same time 
New Delhi could not be indi f ferent to the p l igh t of the Tamils in 
S r i Lanka. Here New Delhi 's domestic compulsions appeared to be 
1 '• 
d i c t a t i n g policy towards a neighbour. Also« the Tamil s t ruggle was 
seen as a chance to enhance New Delhi ' s p res t ige by project ing 
2 
i t s e l f as the 'big b ro ther ' in the region. 
Under the supervision of IPKF, e lec t ions were held in North 
East Province of S r i Lan);a (af ter merger of the two provinces) . 
The most v io len t and mi l i t an t Tamil group LTTE surrendered with 
arms t o a large ex ten t . The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the ro le of 
IPKF was hai led by both the Super Powers, USA and USSR. But, as 
fa r as the issue of the p lan ta t ion Tamils i s concerned/ the accord 
l e f t the future of the p l an ta t ion Tamils (of Indian origin) 
2. Joshi , Manoj, "The Ignored Signals" in Frontl i t ie , July 7-20, 
1990. 
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untouched, which was a major lacuna, for the Tamil demand is not 
l imi ted to a provincia l council and par i ty for Tamil with Sinhala 
as the o f f i c i a l language. Rajmohan Gandhi, a leading jou rna l i s t 
2 looks on accord as an e r r o r . He wri tes "The pro-Tamil th rus t of 
I n d i a ' s Lankan policy has tended t o make the Lankan majority and 
the Lankan au tho r i t i e s a n t i Indian add more suspicious of t he i r 
Tamils. The Accord, sadly, was another e r r o r . Though the 
Government of India was not a par ty t o the dispute in S r i Lanka, 
i t became a par ty to an accord for resolving the d ispute . The 
jo in t demand of the LTTS, the JVP, the students of S r i Lanka and 
the Colombo Government, for withdrawal of the IPKP was a conclu-
s ive proof of the Accord's f a i l u r e " . 
On the other hand, there is the massive influx of Tamil 
refugees in to Tamil Nadu. Thousands of refugees have come so far< 
hundreds refugee camps have been se t up in the Southern S t a t e . 
The p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s in Tamil Nadu are making i t a p o l i t i c a l 
issue a l ready. I t seems an undending turmoi l . Now India has 
ca l l ed back her fo rces . The l a s t so ld ie r returned home in March 
3 
1990. Rajesh Kadiyan wri tes , "After 956? days in Sr i Lanka a t a 
repor ted cost of Rs. 300 crores and a t a loss of 1155 l ives with 
1. Mohan Ram, S r i Lanka : The Fractured Is land , p . 138. 
2. Gandhi, Rajmohan, "Common Sense on Sr i Lanka" in The Hindustan 
ZinSLs. 21 June, 1989. 
3 . Kadiyan, Rajesh, Ind i a ' s S r i Lankan Fiasco, Peace-keepers a t 
War^  Vision Books, Ne^ 3»«»h\ \99o 
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t h ree tirnt^s as many wounded, t h e Indian Army was home. The end 
r e s u l t of t h i s huge Indian undertaking was s imi la r to the r e s t 
of th>c Indian involvement in S r i Lanka - i t was marked by 
f a i l u r e - because 90,000 refugees were s t i l l in India when the 
IPKF withdrew from the is land in March 1990. 
Indian a t t i t u d e towards the problems of Tamil community 
(both Indian and Sr i Lankan) in S r i Lanka has been sympathetic. 
India t r i e d her best to resolve the most genuine problem of 
Indian migrants/ the problem of t h e i r c i t i z e n s h i p . And t h i s 
problem is now almost s e t t l e d . In case of other problems inclu-
ding regional autonomy, language e t c . India has spoken in 
favour of Tamil community. But India never supported the 
s e p a r a t i s t movement in Sr i Lanka, because India i s responsible 
enough in c rea t ing and preserving peace in the region. If 
India ignores the problem, other world powers would get chance 
t o enter in the region which would lead t o a more complex 
s i t u a t i o n . That is why Ind i a ' s ro le has become very important 
t o p ro tec t the region. 
* * * « 
CONCmS ION 
The major p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m , c o n c e r n i n g t h e I n d i a n 
m i g r a n t s i n S r i Lanka, was t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e i r c i t i z e n s h i p 
which i s now s e t t l e d . But a f t e r s o many e f f o r t s and s t e p s 
t a k e n by b o t h t h e c o u n t r i e s , t h e b a s i c e t h n i c d i f f e r e n c e s s t i l l 
p e r s i s t . I t can be s a i d t h a t t h e e f f o r t s made so f a r were not 
enough and a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e r e were some m i s t a k e s on a l l p a r t s . 
Had s u c c e s s i v e S r i Lankan G o v e r n m e n t s ' o f f e r s no t been so l a t e 
and so l i t t l e , t h e y c o u l d h a v e p a c i f i e d t h e i r T a m i l s w i t h h a l f 
of what t h e y h a v e t o g i v e now. Had t h e B u d d h i s t c l e r g y and t h e 
S i n h a l a c i t i z e n s been l e s s c h a u v i n i s t i c , t h e government of S r i 
Lanka would h a v e made b e t t e r o f f e r s t o t h e T a m i l s . I f i n e a r l i e r 
d e c a d e s p o p u l a r Tami l l e a d e r s had been more u n i t e d , i n i t i a t i v e 
would not h a v e p a s s e d t o t h e LTTE o r s i r a i l a r b o d i e s . Now, w i t h o u t 
a l o n g t e r m s o l u t i o n of t h e S i n h a l a - T a m i l c o n f l i c t i n S r i Lanka 
t h e r e can be no p e a c e o r s t a b i l i t y i n S r i Lanka, and h e n c e i n t h e 
whole r e g i o n . I n d i a and S r i Lanka w i l l r ema in p r o b l e m s f o r each 
o t h e r . To c u t a c r o s s t h e s e p r o b l e m s , any s o l u t i o n t o t h e e t h n i c 
c o n f l i c t n e e d s t o be r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t and t o h a v e a s i t s f o u n -
d a t i o n , a r e c o g n i t i o n of S r i L a n k a ' s r e a l i t y - t h a t i t c o m p a r i s e s 
two e t h n i c g r o u p s . In o r d e r t o work sucJi a s o l u t i o n t h e S i n h a l a 
mc i jo r i ty n e e d s t o be more g e n e r o u s l y accommodat ive and a d j u s t i n g 
and t o be n e u t r a l i z e d on t h e Tamil demands and be p e r s u a d e d t o 
I l l 
recognise the Tamil r ight to their identi ty as the price of the 
keeping the nation - s ta te together. The majority cottinunity, 
the Sinhalese are unaware of the fact that a nation-state rests 
not only on the sense of shared his tor ical memories# interests , 
values and sense of belonging together* but also despite l inguis-
t i c , cultural and religious mult ipl ici ty. I t follows that the 
greater the absence of commitment on the part of majority 
community to accommodate various minorities ' ident i t ies , the 
greater is the potential for ethnic confl ic t . There appears to 
be l i t t l e hope for an immediate solution to the guerilla warfare 
in the north-east and the lack of Parliamentary representation 
denied to the Sri Lankan Tamils since 1983. Since then, there 
is a gradual evolution of authoritarianism that has threatened 
democracy and institutuonalized the pol i t ics of violence and 
terrorism. In fact, Sri Lanka provides an- interesting laboratory 
to social sc ient is ts in order to experiment the linkage between 
po l i t i cs (both internal and external) and the tensions generated 
out of racial disharmony. Sooner or l a t e r , Sr i Lankan Government 
and the people have to realize that they have to build a pol i -
t i c a l system in which the different ethnic minorities be allowed 
to live with reasonable po l i t i ca l sat isfact ion. To build this 
type of pol i t ica l system, there should be acceptance of pluralism, 
enforcement of rule of law to protect minorities and renxinciation 
of Tamil l inguis t ic and ethnic separatism. Formation of a 
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nat ional government and fresh e lec t ions can serve the purpose 
t o a large ex t en t . To take these decisions may look d i f f i c u l t , 
but i t is e s sen t i a l for the survival of the nat ion . What 
India can contr ibute a t t h i s juncture is the e jec t ion of LTTE 
from Tamil Nadu. 
The e thnic divide is so deep and the a b i l i t y of the 
nation. 's p o l i t i c a l leaders t o s top the d r i f t so uncertain tha t 
S r i Lanka would need a lo t of good luck t o emerge from the 
present chaos. And I wish Sr i Lanka a good lucki 
ft * * * 
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